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  In the spring of 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Massachusetts v. EPA  that 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) must promulgate automobile tailpipe 
C02 emission standards under Section 202 of the Clean Air Act (CAA).  American 
environmentalists hailed the Supreme Court’s decision as an important victory in the 
battle to curb global warming.  This article argues to the contrary that: 1) a large body of 
economic work demonstrates that the likely pattern of costs and benefits from climate 
change in the United States bears no resemblance to the pollution problems that Congress 
intended to deal with in the Clean Air Act – with moderate climate change predominantly 
benefiting, rather than harming, the U.S. --  so that that the Clean Air Act cannot 
reasonably be interpreted to cover greenhouse gas emissions;  2) By effectively forcing 
the EPA to regulate ghg emissions under a statute that was never intended to cover the 
very different problem of climate change, the Court has changed the policy status quo in 
a way that makes socially desirable federal climate change legislation less likely; and 3) 
given the global nature of the greenhouse gas emission problem, unilateral emission 
limits in the U.S. are likely to be worse than ineffective, in that they will likely have the 
perverse effect of lessening the incentive for latecomers to climate change regulation 
(such as China) to themselves take costly action to reduce such emissions.  The article 
concludes by arguing that a sensible formulation of U.S. climate change policy would 
involve measures to respond both to the long-term threat to the U.S. and the short-term 
threat to developing countries.  There are policy instruments appropriate to these goals: 
large increases in subsidies for research and development into clean coal and alternative 
fuels to respond to the long term threat to the U.S.; redirecting foreign aid to fund climate 

















Climate Change Hysteria and the Supreme Court:  
The Economic Impact of Global Warming on the U.S. and the  
Misguided Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions under the Clean Air Act  
Jason Scott Johnston 
 
 
In the spring of 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Massachusetts v. EPA that 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) must promulgate automobile tailpipe 
C02 emission standards under Section 202 of the Clean Air Act (CAA).  American 
environmentalists hailed the Supreme Court’s decision as an important victory in the 
battle to curb global warming.  It is not. The majority opinion in Massachusetts v. EPA 
resonates with the alarmist rhetoric that has come to dominate the climate change policy 
debate and its reasoning reflects fundamental misunderstandings regarding the likely 
impact of a global warming on the health and welfare of the people of the United States 
that climate change alarmism has created.  An extensive and very well established body 
of systematic empirical economic evidence shows that in the short to medium run, a 
warmer climate will be predominantly beneficial, rather than harmful, to the United 
States.  In the longer run, investments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions may pay off in 
a lessened probability of harmful climate change, but whether they do so will depend 
almost entirely upon the actions taken by other countries, in particular by China.   
In apparent ignorance of these basic facts about climate change, and in an almost 
hysterical frenzy to do something about the supposedly imminent demise of our blue 
planet, the Supreme Court majority in Massachusetts v. EPA interpreted the Clean Air 
Act – intended by Congress to reduce largely localized air pollution and thereby provide 
the local public good of improved health – as requiring the EPA to impose greenhouse 
gas emission limits.  Not only will such limits likely be ineffective, but by requiring the 
EPA to regulate greenhouse emissions, the Court has effectively forced a change in the 
status quo that makes economically sensible and environmentally sound federal climate 
change legislation much less likely.  Moreover, unlike the air pollution that Congress 
intended to regulate under the CAA, even if the U.S. were to immediately implement 
effective greenhouse gas (ghg) reduction strategies, those efforts might have little or no 
impact in reducing harm from global warming.   It is the atmospheric stock of C02 and 
other ghg’s that is contributing to global warming, and the flow of ghg emissions from 2 
the U.S. are only a fraction, and a likely declining one at that, of the total global flow. 
Paradoxically, it is possible that the more effective are present day U.S. ghg emission 
limits, the lower the future incentive for rapidly industrializing, dominant C02 emitters 
such as China to themselves curb such emissions.  
This article begins in Part I by briefly summarizing the Court’s opinion in 
Massachusetts v. EPA.  In Part II, I then set out a general framework for analyzing the 
opinion, and apply that framework in three stages. First I recall the goals, objectives and 
structure of the Clean Air Act and argue that the likely pattern of costs and benefits from 
climate change in the United States bears no resemblance to the pollution problems that 
Congress intended to deal with in the Clean Air Act, so that that law cannot reasonably 
be interpreted to cover greenhouse gas emissions.   My argument relies heavily upon a 
very large empirical economic literature that shows how in the short to medium term – up 
to 2100 – climate change will likely generate net benefits for the United States, not net 
costs.  One cannot fault the Supreme Court opinions in Massachusetts v. EPA for failing 
to even acknowledge the existence of this evidence; the government apparently did not 
produce it, and none of the reports of the ostensibly authoritative Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) thoroughly discuss this or any other economic work on 
climate change.   But the economic evidence is extensive and extremely important: it 
shows that temperature increases in the 2-3 centigrade range are likely to provide many 
regions of the U.S. with large benefits in the form of the amenity value of a warmer 
climate, increased agricultural productivity, reduced deaths and disease due to cold 
weather, and increased value from warm weather recreational pursuits.  To be sure, this 
same body of empirical work shows that some regions in the U.S. may be net losers from 
a warmer climate (even prior to 2100).  But the costs of reducing ghg emissions fall 
disproportionately not on those states and regions that have the most to lose from a 
warmer climate and therefore potentially the most to gain from ghg emission reductions, 
but rather on states and regions that would actually likely be benefited by a warmer 
climate. The Clean Air Act imposed federal air pollution reduction requirements on some 
places that did not have a serious air pollution problem at the time and its costs were not 
uniformly felt  (auto industry states likely bearing more costs).   These interstate 
variations in the distribution of costs and benefits were well known by federal legislators 3 
and legislative bargaining over their allocation is in large part responsible for the 
complexity of the CAA.  But overall, the Clean Air Act mandated costly nationwide air 
pollution reduction that generated nationwide health and welfare benefits.  To interpret 
that statute as covering ghg emissions, as the Supreme Court did in Massachusetts v. 
EPA, is to presume that legislators who voted to impose costs on some of their 
constituents so that all of their constituents would get present and future benefits from 
cleaner air would also have voted to impose even larger costs on all their constituents so 
that people in other states or districts could perhaps someday get benefits from a 
stabilized climate.  To take this view, which comprises the Court’s core holding in 
Massachusetts v. EPA, is not to interpret the Clean Air Act, but to rewrite it. 
As I explain in Part IV, one cannot instrumentally justify this core holding by 
pointing to the desirable incentive effects that it will have in spurring Congress to take 
action on climate change.  By effectively forcing the EPA to regulate ghg emissions 
under a statute that was never intended to cover the very different problem of climate 
change, the Court has changed the policy status quo in a way that makes socially 
desirable climate change legislation at the federal level much less likely.  The Court’s 
decision provides the illusion of benefits to advocates of climate change action, and so 
lessens the marginal legislative benefit from expending resources to introduce and enact 
economically and scientifically sound climate change legislation.  While the Court’s 
decision may ultimately impose costs, those costs will result only if and when regulations 
and written, implemented and enforced.   These subsequent stages are traditional venues 
for lobbying and litigation, and with so many opportunities to reduce the ultimate impact 
and cost of the Court’s decision, Congressional representatives from states and regions 
that stand to lose from ghg emission regulation have no need to take additional costly 
legislative action. 
It might be argued that even if the Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA fails 
to spur a desirable federal legislative response, it may well spur action on climate change 
by other nations.   As my central thesis maintains, however, climate change is a 
remarkably different problem than traditional air pollution.   Whereas the United States 
Congress could take effective unilateral action in the CAA to curb U.S. air pollution, 
neither it nor the U.S. E.P.A. can take effective unilateral action to reduce harms to (some 4 
parts) of the U.S. from global warming.   As I explain in Part IV, given the global nature 
of the greenhouse gas emission problem, unilateral emission limits in the U.S. are likely 
to be worse than ineffective, in that they will likely have the perverse effect of lessening 
the incentive for latecomers to climate change regulation (such as China) to themselves 
take costly action to reduce such emissions.   
I conclude in Part V by stressing the important limits to the argument that I am 
making in this Article.  My argument that the Court badly erred in interpreting the CAA 
to encompass ghg emissions does not imply that the U.S. should simply ignore global 
warming and make no effort to curb its ghg emissions.   Various strands in the climate 
change scientific literature show that in the long run, global warming may bring 
admittedly highly uncertain but nonetheless potentially very harmful long term 
consequences to the U.S.  In the short to medium run, global warming may cause 
significant harm in developing countries.   A sensible formulation of U.S. climate change 
policy would involve measures to respond both to the long-term threat to the U.S. and the 
short-term threat to developing countries.  There are policy instruments appropriate to 
these goals: large increases in subsidies for research and development into clean coal and 
alternative fuels are a sensible way for the U.S. to respond to the long term threat to the 
U.S.; redirecting foreign aid to fund climate change adaptation in developing countries is 
a sensible way to respond to the short term threat to developing countries.   But neither 
these nor other sound responses to climate change can be pursued within the framework 
established by the 1970 Clean Air Act.  
  
I. The Supreme Court and Climate Change: An Overview of Massachusetts v. EPA
  
The litigation in Massachusetts v. EPA
1 began in 1999, when the State of 
Massachusetts (along with several other state and local governments and environmental 
groups) filed a rulemaking petition requesting that the federal Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) regulation of “greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles” under 
Section 202(a) of the federal Clean Air Act.   After receiving thousands of comments, 
and requesting a special report from the National Research Council, the EPA denied the 
petition for rulemaking.  The EPA explained that it either lacked the authority to issue 
                                                 
1 Massachusetts v. EPA, No. 05-1120, U.S. S.Ct., April 2, 2007.  Citations to slip opinion. 5 
climate change regulations under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, or if it did have 
such legal authority, then as a policy matter, it would choose not to exercise that 
authority.  More precisely, on the first point, EPA argued that Congress had considered 
and decided against regulating greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act, and that 
greenhouse gases were not “air pollutants” subject to regulation under Section 202 of the 
Clean Air Act.
2  On the second point, EPA found that there was too much uncertainty 
over the causal relationship global mean temperature change and human greenhouse gas 
emissions, and that regulation of such gases under Section 202 of the CAA would in any 
event conflict with the national policy on climate change adopted through Executive 
Order, an approach that relied upon incentives for technological innovation and voluntary 
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and which emphasized the need for greenhouse 
gas reductions by both developed and developing countries.
3
Their appeal of EPA’s refusal to regulate to the D.C. Circuit federal Court of 
Appeals was denied, but the plaintiffs in Massachusetts v. EPA had better luck with the 
Supreme Court.  Over strenuous dissents on all points, a bare five Justice majority held 
that not only did the plaintiffs have standing to bring their suit, but that the EPA did 
indeed have the statutory authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions as “air 
pollutants” under Section 202 of the Clean Air Act.  The majority concluded that EPA 
could not refuse to exercise this authority on policy grounds – such as the potential 
conflict with executive branch climate change initiatives – that were inconsistent with the 
substantive regulatory standard found in Section 202 – whether or not the pollutant 
“cause[s], or contribute[s] to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to 
endanger public health or welfare.”
4
The Court’s discussion of its final point – that the policies relied upon by EPA 
were inconsistent with the statutory standard requiring a finding that endangerment of 
public health or welfare could be “reasonably anticipated” -- was very short. According 
to the majority, the existence of “residual uncertainty” as to “various features of climate 
                                                 
2 In pertinent part, Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §7521(a) states that “the [EPA] 
Administrator shall by regulation prescribe …standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from 
any class of classes of new vehicles…which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which 
may be reasonably anticipated to endanger public health or welfare…” 
3 See the summary of EPA’s position at slip opinion pp. 9-10. 
4 Slip opinion at 30. 6 
change” is irrelevant to the statutory question that the agency must address, which is 
“whether sufficient information exists to make an endangerment finding.”   EPA’s 
obligation to make this reasonable endangerment finding in turn reduces to an obligation 
to form a “scientific judgment” as to whether “greenhouse gases contribute to climate 
change.” Obviously, in the view of the majority, this scientific judgment does not require 
consultation with the State department and has “nothing to do” with whether regulating 
greenhouse gases under the CAA would impair the President’s ability to negotiate with 
developing nations to reduce their emissions.
5
The bulk of the majority’s opinion is devoted to justifying its holding that the 
plaintiffs have standing to sue and that the EPA has statutory authority to regulate.  The 
Court easily concluded that EPA has the authority to regulate ghg’s as air pollutants 
under CAA Section 202.   According the Court, there was no ambiguity at all in the 
statutory definition of “air pollutant” – as “any air pollution agent or combination of such 
agents, including any physical, chemical…substance or matter which is emitted into or 
otherwise enters the ambient air…”
6 – which clearly encompassed carbon dioxide and 
other ghg’s.  Moreover, for the Court, Congressional action and inaction during the 
1980’s – in failing to amend the CAA to explicitly include emissions limits for ghg’s but 
instead merely encouraging interagency collaboration and research – “tells us nothing 
about what Congress meant when it amended §202(a)(1) in 1970 and 1977.”
7
In finding that the constitutional requirements for standing were met, the Court 
relied on two rather different theories.  On the one hand, the majority said that 
Massachusetts had met the traditional (albeit not very old) three-prong test
8 requiring (on 
summary judgment) that the plaintiff produce affidavits and similar evidence of 1) a 
concrete and particularized injury that is either actual or imminent; 2) that the injury is 
fairly traceable to the defendant, and 3) that it is likely that a favorable decision will 
redress that injury.   As to the first requirement – that the plaintiff suffer a “concrete and 
particularized injury” – the Court relied almost entirely on the affidavit opinion of 
climate scientist Michael MacCracken to the effect that “qualified scientific experts 
                                                 
5 Slip opinion at 31-32. 
6 CAA §302(g), 42 U.S.C. §7602(g). 
7 Slip opinion at 27. 
8 Summarized, for example, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 581 (1992). 7 
involved in climate change research” have reached a “strong consensus” that “global 
warming had caused an increase of global sea level of between 10 and 20 centimeters 
over the 20
th century,” and that these “rising seas had already begun to swallow 
Massachusetts’ coastal land” and “if sea levels continue to rise as predicted, one 
Massachusetts official believes that a significant fraction of coastal property will be 
‘either permanently lost through inundation or temporarily lost through periodic storm 
surge and flooding events.’”
9  Having found that such sea level rise constituted a 
“concrete and particularized injury” to the state of Massachusetts, it was not difficult for 
the majority to go on to find that the other two prongs of the standing test were met.  The 
MacCracken affidavit also established causation, for according to that affidavit, carbon 
dioxide emissions from the U.S. transportation sector alone would make the U.S. the 
third largest emitter of C02, so that “judged by any standard, U.S. motor-vehicle 
emissions make a meaningful contribution to greenhouse gas concentrations and hence, 
according to petitioners, to global warming.”
10  Finally, as to remedy, for the majority of 
the court, even if developing countries such as China and India increase greenhouse gas 
emissions “substantially” over the next century, “[a] reduction in domestic emissions 
would slow the pace of global emissions increases, no matter what happens elsewhere,”
11 
so that federal emissions limits would indeed remedy the plaintiff’s harm. 
The Court also set out an alternative and quite novel ground for Massachusetts’s 
standing: that state’s “quasi-sovereign interest” in protecting its territory by invoking its 
“procedural right to challenge the rejection of its rulemaking petition as arbitrary and 
capricious.”
12  The majority found this theory of quasi-sovereign state standing not in its 
constitutional jurisprudence, or in any case involving standing to challenge rulemaking 
by a federal agency, but rather in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,
13 an interstate 
nuisance dispute involving a lawsuit by the state of Georgia against a private polluter 
                                                 
9 Slip opinion at 20. 
10 Slip opinion at 22. 
11 Slip opinion at 23.  
12 Slip opinion at pp. 16-17.  The source of the “procedural right” mentioned by the Court is 42 U.S.C. 
§7607(b)(1).   While it is outside my primary purpose in this essay, it is worth noting that 7607(b)(1) had 
not previously been understood as conferring any “procedural right” beyond that already conferred by the 
Administrative Procedure Act; instead, it simplify provides that judicial review of emission standards under 
the CAA can be had only in the D.C. Circuit. 
13 206 U.S. 230 (1907). 8 
located in the adjacent state of Tennessee.   That case involved federal common law of 
interstate nuisance, an area that the Court has long ago held was preempted by the new 
federal environmental statutes.
14 Nonetheless, the majority in Massachusetts v. EPA 
approvingly quoted language from the old interstate nuisance case that defines a State’s 
“quasi-sovereign” interest as one “independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in 
all the earth and air within its domain.  It has the last word as to whether its mountains 
shall be stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air.”
15
 
II.  Climate Change versus Conventional Air Pollution: Because of Fundamental 
Differences in Cost, Benefits and Time Horizon, Congress did Not Intend or 
Anticipate the Regulation of Greenhouse Gases as “Pollutants” Under the Clean Air 
Act
 
  To summarize the preceding discussion, the majority opinion in Massachusetts v. 
EPA holds: 1) that greenhouse gases (ghg’s) cause a kind of air pollution that can be 
regulated under the Clean Air Act, 2) that it is constitutionally permissible for states and 
private parties who believe that they will be injured by such pollution to sue to force EPA 
to promulgate such regulation; and, 3) that EPA cannot use uncertainty over either the 
need for or impact of regulation as a reason for postponing making a decision.  In this 
part of the article, I critically analyze these three conclusions.  I undertake this analysis 
by asking how various legislative preferences either would or would not be furthered by 
having EPA regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act.  This point of view 
allows me to consider a range of legislative preferences, asking how alternative types of 
federal legislator would have responded to the hypothetical question: did you intend for 
the Clean Air Act to include ghg’s and global warming (and if so, did you intend also to 
allow suits such as that in Massachusetts v. EPA in which private parties and particular 
state attorney generals can legally compel the agency to act?)   
The approach that I take here is therefore consistent with what has become known 
as the purposive approach to statutory interpretation.
16  Under this approach, a judge 
interpreting a statute that gives somewhat vague or unclear directions on a particular 
                                                 
14 [insert support] 
15 Slip opinion at 15, quoting from Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907). 
16 For an overview of this approach to statutory interpretation, see Philip Frickey, "Structuring purposive 
statutory interpretation: An American perspective," 80 Australian L.J. 849 (2006) and William Eskridge 
and Philip Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 321 (1990). 9 
point views that statute as an incomplete contract, and asks whether Congress would have 
wanted the statute to apply to a particular situation in a particular way.  If judges are 
pretty good at figuring out what Congress would or would not have wanted, then through 
such purposive judicial interpretation, judges lower the transaction costs of legislation 
and further legislative goals.   As summarized by one of its leading practitioners, Judge 
Richard Posner, on this approach (which goes by terms such as “imaginative 
reconstruction,” or “pragmatic” statutory interpretation), judges “stick pretty close to 
statutory text and judicial precedent,” but nonetheless interpret statutes by looking for the 
“actual interests at stake, the purposes of the participants, the policies behind the 
precedents, and the consequences of alternative decisions.”
17
While this essay is not the place for a general defense of purposive statutory 
interpretation, a few words are in order in defense of its application to the set of issues 
raised in Massachusetts v. EPA.  As the petitioners hoped,
18 the majority opinion in that 
case read quite broadly and literally the statutory definition of “air pollutant” – as “any 
air pollution agent or combination of such agents, including any physical, 
chemical…substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient 
air…”
19 – to easily include greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide, methane and others 
that are emitted into the ambient air in auto emissions.  Precisely because this statutory 
definition is so broad, however, interpreting it without even inquiring into Congressional 
purposes in enacting the CAA can lead to absurd and perverse results that conflict with 
those purposes.  Most fundamentally, in mandating air pollution reduction in the CAA, 
Congress imposed very large costs on many American regions and industries. But it did 
so because the median member of that body (actually the vast majority of members), 
believed that the overwhelming majority of Americans would realize very real and 
tangible benefits -- in the reduction and elimination of a nuisance, and in living healthier 
and longer lives – from incurring the costs of air pollution reduction.  Below I survey a 
                                                 
17 Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory 208-209 (1999).  
18  As the author of the petitioner’s Supreme Court brief has explained,  “[I]n arguing the questions 
regarding EPA’s authority and discretion under the Clean Air Act, we a made a tactical decision to rely 
almost exclusively on the text of the statute.  Our thinking was…First, most simply, the text of the statute 
clearly pointed in our direction.” Lisa Heinzerling, Climate Change in the Supreme Court, 38 Envtl. L 3, 11 
(2008). 
19 CAA §302(g), 42 U.S.C. §7602(g). 10 
large body of economic work that overwhelmingly shows that in the climate change 
world’s short to medium term – out to 2100 -- few if any regions of the United States are 
likely to suffer serious harm from global warming, while many regions and industries 
may well realize modest benefits.  The naïve literalist interpretation of the CAA adopted 
by the majority thus effectively decides that Congress also intended the CAA to require 
Americans to incur highly uncertain but potentially severe economic costs – the cost of 
reducing ghg emissions – in exchange for little or no benefit to them during this century.  
It is difficult to see how such a result could be squared with any reasonable construction 
of Congressional intent in passing the CAA. 
Here, therefore, I adopt the purposive approach, asking whether the interests, 
purposes and policies that supported regulating conventional air pollution under the CAA 
would also support the regulation of ghg’s under that statute.  
 
A. Traditional air pollution regulation under the Clean Air Act 
 
In deciding that carbon dioxide may constitute an air pollutant within the meaning 
of the CAA, the Supreme Court majority argued that the broad statutory definition of air 
pollutant as “any air pollution agent or combination of such agents, including any 
physical, chemical…substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the 
ambient air” was so broad as to include “all airborne compounds of whatever stripe…”
20 
The Supreme Court majority in Massachusetts v. EPA gave this very general, vague 
statutory provision a very broad reading, so as to include carbon dioxide and other ghg’s 
within the statutory definition of air pollution.  Taking the purposive approach to 
statutory interpretation, here I ask whether this interpretative decision is consistent with 
the purposes of the Clean Air Act in the following, precise, sense: whether the 
intertemporal pattern of benefits and costs generated by regulating ghg’s under the CAA 
is likely to be at least similar to the intertemporal pattern of costs and benefits that 
Congress had in mind when it regulated conventional air pollutants under that statute.    
To conduct this analysis, I must briefly review how traditional air pollutants are 
regulated under the Clean Air Act.  Although it has evolved in several ways since its 
                                                 
20 Mass. v. EPA, slip opinion at 26.  The CAA also defines the national “welfare” that is to be protected by 
the second NAAQS discussed below as including “effects on soil, water, crops, vegetation,…weather, 
visibility, and climate…” 42 U.S.C. §7602(h). 11 
passage in 1970, the heart of the Clean Air Act remains the system of National Ambient 
Air Quality Standards (NAAQS).  NAAQS apply to conventional or, as they are called 
under the Clean Air Act, criteria air pollutants.  The criteria air pollutants that are the 
focus of regulation under the CAA are lead, particulates of various diameters, sulphur 
dioxide, oxides of nitrogen, ground level ozone and carbon monoxide.
21
All of the criteria pollutants share a very basic characteristic: as found in the 
lower troposphere, all of these substances are pure economic bads in the sense that 
beyond some threshold concentration level, their presence is at least an annoying 
nuisance to daily life and at worst may cause adverse acute or long term health effects as 
well as secondary harms such as impaired visibility in otherwise scenic areas.
22   
Pollution due to any of these substances is itself an economic bad – it has adverse effects 
on human health or other aspects of welfare and it lowers productivity or utility (to use 
economists’ jargon for consumer welfare).   
This focus on adverse health effects is equally true of federal regulation of new 
stationary sources of air pollution and of automobile tailpipe emissions under the Clean 
Air Act.
23 Some of these adverse impacts are acute or immediate (e.g., acute asthma 
episodes induced by very high levels of ground level ozone).  Today – when ambient 
                                                 
21 As explained on the Environmental Protection Agency’s website, “[t]he Clean Air Act requires EPA to 
set National Ambient Air Quality Standards for six common air pollutants. These commonly found air 
pollutants (also known as "criteria pollutants") are found all over the United States. They are particle 
pollution (often referred to as particulate matter), ground-level ozone, carbon monoxide, sulfur oxides, 
nitrogen oxides, and lead. These pollutants can harm your health and the environment, and cause property 
damage. Of the six pollutants, particle pollution and ground-level ozone are the most widespread health 
threats. EPA calls these pollutants "criteria" air pollutants because it regulates them by developing human 
health-based and/or environmentally-based criteria (science-based guidelines) for setting permissible 
levels. The set of limits based on human health is called primary standards. Another set of limits intended 
to prevent environmental and property damage is called secondary standards.”  See 
http://www.epa.gov/air/urbanair. 
22 While EPA now sets primary NAAQS to reduce harm to human health, it is important to remember that 
when smog – the accumulation of too much ground level ozone and unburned hydrocarbons from 
automobile exhaust -- first became a problem, it was viewed as a nuisance.  For example, as late as 1971, a 
political scientist writing about air pollution control felt perfectly safe in saying that “[p]hotochemical 
smog remains more an irritating nuisance than a serious threat to the survival of urbanites.  The nuisance 
has been irritating enough to provoke widespread complaints, however, especially in southern California.  
California officials have played an important part in inducing the automobile industry to do something 
about the smog problem.” Matthew A. Crenson, The Un-Politics of Air pollution: A Study of Non-
Decisionmaking in Cities 9 (1971).   
23 Regulated, respectively, under 42 U.S.C. §7521(a)(1)(2000), and regulations found at Control of Air 
Pollution from New Motor Vehicles: Tier 2 Motor Vehicle Emission Standards and Gasoline Sulfur 
Control Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. 6698 (Feb. 10, 2000), and 42 U.S.C. §7410 et. seq., with 69 industry 
categories as set out in 40 C.F.R. §60, Subpart C (2006). 12 
levels of air pollution in the United States are much lower than when the CAA was 
passed -- the health benefits from further pollution reduction are mostly reductions in the 
probability of diseases with long latency periods or that are chronic.  Thus the primary 
benefit that Congress anticipated from the Clean Air Act is a reduction in the probability 
and/or severity adverse health outcomes suffered by presently living generation of 
Americans.  
The other crucial, and somewhat paradoxical feature of the Clean Air Act is that 
the pollution Congress attacked in the CAA was not interregional or interjursidictional 
but primarily local.  The criteria air pollutants and automobile emissions are regulated 
because they were perceived to be local public bads: they cause harm to human health in 
particular airsheds, and the amount of harm depends upon the level and type of industrial 
activity and the amount of automobile and truck driving that takes place in a particular 
airshed (or as they are called under the CAA, air quality regions), as well as upon local 
and regional topography.   Across vast areas of the United States, air pollution is not a 
problem.  Indeed, many of the criteria pollutants – sulfur dioxide, carbon monoxide, and 
oxides of nitrogen – are a problem only in the most urbanized areas of the country.  For 
example, in the vast areas encompassed by the U.S. plains states, the only criteria air 
pollutant that is a problem is particulate pollution in the form of dust from agriculture.   
Just as the levels of traditional air pollution vary greatly across different regions 
and metropolitan areas in the U.S. so too do the benefits and costs of pollution reduction. 
At least in terms of health effects, places with very little pollution generally suffer lower 
harm from pollution, and therefore benefit less from pollution reduction, than places with 
lots of pollution, where the adverse health effects, and benefits from pollution reduction, 
are greater.   
Of course pollution reduction is not generally free.  It is costly.  In understanding 
the CAA, what is important is not just the total cost of achieving pollution reduction 
goals, but also the geographic distribution of the costs.  Most importantly, the geographic 
distribution of the cost of pollution reduction is very different for stationary sources 
(industry) than for mobile sources (autos).  This difference in the distribution of cost is a 
basic determinant of the structure of the CAA, explaining the way in which the CAA tries 
to reduce pollution from these two different types of sources.  13 
For industrial pollution, both the benefits and costs of pollution reduction are 
primarily local. That is, if it is local industry that is responsible for the air pollution 
problem, then it is local industry and local communities that will bear the cost of 
pollution reduction.  Given the highly localized concentration of both benefits and costs 
from reducing stationary source air pollution, the CAA’s ambient air quality standards 
(NAAQS) are set by the federal regulator and are nationally uniform, but the states were 
given the job – through what are called State Implementation Plans -- of determining how 
to lower stationary source emissions so as to meet the national ambient air quality 
standards. Notably, while EPA is not allowed to consider costs in setting NAAQS,
24 (the 
national ambient air quality standards are supposedly based purely on health 
considerations), the states are allowed to consider costs in setting emission standards for 
existing industrial facilities that are necessary to meet NAAQS.
25
For new industrial facilities, the CAA has since its inception required technology-
based emission standards that are ostensibly uniform within particular industrial 
categories.
26   But neither the NAAQS nor the technology-based standards under the 
CAA are in fact nationally uniform.  Before the law was even fully implemented, the 
courts held and then Congress amended the statute to require that even areas of the 
country with relatively clean air (areas that were in attainment with the national ambient 
standards) had to meet (different) technology-based air pollution control standards (so 
                                                 
24 As the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed in Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., 531 
U.S. 457 (2001).  
25 Section 108(b)(1) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. §7408(b)(1), directs the Administrator to issue to the States 
“information on air pollution control techniques, which shall include data relating to the cost of installation 
or operation.”  Also, in Section 109(d)(2)(C)(iv), the CAA requires that the Clean Air Scientific Advisory 
Commission advise the Administrator of any “adverse public health, welfare, social, economic or energy 
effects which may result from various strategies for attainment and maintenance” of the NAAQS.  As the 
Supreme Court explained in Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. at 470, “these 
provisions enable the Administrator to assist the States in carrying out their statutory role as primary 
implementers of the NAAQS. It is to the States that the CAA assigns initial and primary responsibility for 
deciding what emissions reductions will be required from which sources. See 42 U. S. C. §§ 7407(a), 7410 
(giving States the duty of developing implementation plans). It would be impossible to perform that task 
intelligently without considering which abatement technologies are most efficient, and most economically 
feasible-which is why we have said that "the most important forum for consideration of claims of economic 
and technological infeasibility is before the state agency formulating the implementation plan," Union Elec. 
Co. v. EPA, 427 U. S., at 266. Thus, federal clean air legislation has, from the very beginning, directed 
federal agencies to develop and transmit implementation data, including cost data, to the States.” 
26 Mandatory federal level technology-based standards now apply both to new stationary sources, under 
Section 111, and to hazardous air pollutants under Section 112.   14 
that they could not simply pollute up to the ambient standard level). 
27 And although 
technology-based standards are tougher in areas that are heavily polluted, such areas 
(called non-attainment areas) have been given more and more time to meet the NAAQS, 
so much time that the statutory deadlines have come to have very little meaning.  All in 
all, when it comes to stationary sources of air pollution – industry – Congress has been 
relatively deferential to the states and to the local cost of air pollution reduction.
28
With mobile sources, the geographic distribution of costs and benefits is different 
and so too is the CAA regulatory structure.   The problem of smog – low level ozone – 
and other pollution from automobile exhausts first became a problem in California, and 
as early as 1959 California had passed state legislation regulating automobile tailpipe 
exhaust emissions.
29  During the 1940’s and 50’s, however, auto pollution was a major 
problem in relatively few American metropolitan areas, and although virtually the entire 
California delegation annually pushed for federal legislation dealing with the problem of 
air pollution from automobile exhausts, they had no success.
30  Federal legislation dealing 
with automobile exhaust emissions did not occur until the 1960’s, when the smog 
problem had spread to a number of other major metropolitan areas in the U.S.  While the 
problem of automobile pollution became national in scope  -- arising in more and more 
heavily populated metropolitan areas -- the production of mobile sources (cars and 
trucks) has always been heavily concentrated in the upper Midwest.
31 Since the cost of 
                                                 
27 When legislation was introduced to amend the law in 1976, it clearly reflected the stark differences in the 
regional costs and benefits of air pollution control: the nation was divided into areas based upon the 
existing level of ambient pollution, with different degrees of increases in pollution allowed, depending 
upon the ambient level (with increases limited even in areas that already were in attainment, the so-called 
Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) provisions).  Bailey, Congress and Air Pollution, at 190-191. 
Senators from western and southern states immediately challenged the PSD provisions.  A Senator from 
Utah said: “The issue is not a clean air or dirty air issue: it is more a growth or no-growth issue.”  Id. at 
191.  A representative from Florida argued that the PSD provisions could have a “profound effect on our 
economy, severely limit potential jobs, create incentives for our basic industries to locate abroad and 
further retard our efforts toward energy self-sufficiency,” and a House amendment to delete the PSD 
provisions from the bill was only narrowly defeated.  Id. at 192. 
28 Moreover, since its passage in 1970, the CAA has left the regulation of old stationary sources that were 
built prior to 1970 entirely to the states (at least for conventional, non-hazardous pollutants).  See Craig N. 
Johnston, Et. Al., Legal Protection of the Environment 268 (2d ed. 2007). 
29 See James E. Krier and Edmund Ursin, Pollution and Policy: A Case Essay on California and Federal 
Experience with Motor Vehicle Air Pollution, 1940-1975, 127-169 (1977). 
30 See Bailey, Pollution __ at __. 
31 In 1967, for example, a full 65% of U.S. automobile industry employment was located in the three 
Midwest states of Ohio, Michigan and Indiana, see “Automotive Wages in Flux,” Federal Reserve Bank of 
Chicago, July 18, 2007, available at http://midwest.chicagofedblogs.org/archives/auto_industry/, and since 15 
reducing automobile exhausts has always been geographically concentrated, at least 
relative to stationary source pollution, it is perhaps not surprising that the primary focus 
of attention when the CAA was passed in 1970 was in fact automobile emissions, and 
that Congress found it much easier to agree on national exhaust emission standards than 
on national industrial pollution standards.  The structure of federal exhaust emission 
legislation was in fact set way back in 1967: all states other than California must meet 
national automobile emission standards; California and only California is allowed to set 
auto emission standards tougher than those set by the federal Environmental Protection 
Agency.
32 Federal exhaust emission standards are technology-based, and require a mix of 
combustion and post-combustion controls designed to reduce emissions of carbon 
monoxide, nitrogen oxides, unburned hydrocarbons (or a subset thereof, volatile organic 
compounds) and particulate matter from diesel engines.
33
The CAA is thus an enormously complex statute whose complexity in large part 
reflects the varying costs and benefits of reducing criteria air pollutants in different states 
and localities.   In the CAA, Congress’s intent was indeed to improve ambient air quality 
by reducing emissions of certain pollutants.  But the way Congress went about achieving 
that general goal in the CAA closely reflected the varying political and economic costs 
and benefits of air pollution control in different regions of the country.  The CAA’s 
distinction between attainment and non-attainment areas effectively permitted more rapid 
economic development in regions that had high air quality in 1970 than in those that 
                                                                                                                                                 
1990, auto industry jobs have steady shifted from this area of the country – which has lost roughly 200,000 
auto industry jobs during this period -- to the south – which has gained about 180,000 jobs during the same 
period.  Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, data available at 
http://chicagofed.org/news_and_conferences/conferences_and_events/files/2006_auto_maclinden.pdf.  
Indeed, the relatively strong growth rate of U.S. automotive manufacturing during the 1990’s was primarily 
due to increased output from new plants in the southern U.S. owned by foreign-based manufacturers. 
Stephen Cooney and Brent D. Yacobucci, U.S. Automotive Industry: Policy Overview and Recent History 
36-49 (Congressional Research Service Report to Congress, April 25, 2005). 
32 This was despite the efforts of Representative Dingell from the auto manufacturing state of Michigan, 
California --  which had set the first auto emission standards – was allowed under the 1967 law to set 
stricter auto emission standards than those set by the federal government. Bailey, Congress and Air 
Pollution, at 134-135. Through Muskie’s efforts, what was to become the Clean Air Act of 1970 set a 1975 
deadline for a 90 per cent decrease in automobile emissions; the political power of the automobile industry 
was nonetheless such that its Congressional allies got the only serious concession made by Muskie in the 
1970 law, provisions allowing the automobile manufacturers to request extensions to the deadlines for 
carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons. Bailey, Congress and Air Pollution, supra note __ at 151-155. 
33 See Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Mobile Source Air Pollution Control, __ Envl. Lawyer __ (Feb. 2000).  16 
already had poor air quality at that time.
34  Yet even in non-attainment areas, by giving 
states the job of implementing and enforcing the law, the CAA consistently recognizes 
interstate variation in and the practical need to consider the social and economic cost of 
air pollution reduction.  Even in its more purely federal approach – nationally uniform 
federal technology-based auto emission standards – the CAA recognizes interstate 
variation in costs and benefits by allowing states to regulate more stringently than 
federally required whenever California – which had the first and most severe local auto 
pollution problem – decides to do so first.  Moreover, the harms that the CAA seeks to 
reduce are primarily health harms to the present generation of Americans.  The CAA did 
indeed impose costs, but it did so to provide present and future health benefits to 
currently living Americans. Crucially, most of the jurisdictions where there were big 
costs – such as the Midwestern rust belt and heavily developed northeastern corridor – 
also got big benefits from reducing air pollution.    
Hence in its actual application, the CAA has generated an outcome with varying 
levels of ambient air quality that roughly (admittedly only very roughly) reflect local and 
regional costs and benefits of air pollution reduction. In asking whether the CAA should 
be interpreted to apply to ghg’s, the relevant question (from the point of view of 
purposive statutory interpretation) is: Does the magnitude and interstate distribution of 
costs and benefits from reducing ghg’s so resemble that from reducing conventional air 
pollutants that it is reasonable, or even plausible, to think that the federal legislators who 
voted in favor of incurring present day costs in order to reduce traditional air pollution 
and thereby confer health benefits upon the present generation of Americans (the CAA 
“deal”)  would also have voted to regulate ghg emissions under that statute?  
 
B. The geographic and intertemporal distribution of U.S. costs and benefits from 
global warming is radically different than the costs and benefits from traditional air 
pollutants: Congress could not have intended to regulate GHG’s under the Clean 
Air Act 
 
                                                 
34 Michael Greenstone, The Impacts of Environmental Regulations on Industrial Activity: Evidence from 
the 1970 and 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments and the Census of Manufactures, 110 J. Pol. Econ. __ 
(2002)(finding that across a very broad sample of pollution-intensive industries, in the first 15 years in 
which the Clean Air Act was in force, 1972–87, relative to attainment counties, nonattainment counties lost 
approximately 590,000 jobs, $37 billion in capital stock, and $75 billion (1987 dollars) of output.)  17 
The answer to this question is, I believe, clearly “no”, for the simple reason that 
the pattern of costs and benefits from regulating ghg’s under the CAA is likely to be 
radically different than the pattern of costs and benefits generated by the regulation of 
traditional air pollutants under that statute.  The impact of greenhouse gases (ghg’s) on 
American society is strikingly different than the traditional pollutants regulated under the 
CAA. Greenhouse gases are to be regulated not because of any direct local health effect, 
but because their accumulation at various concentrations in the atmosphere are causing 
the global climate to warm, and it is believed that this warmer global climate will in turn 
have adverse impacts for particular places both within and outside of the United States.  
Aside from its separate treatment of the stratospheric ozone problem,
35 the CAA is not 
concerned with international air pollution.
36  Therefore, if one is to justify the regulation 
of ghg emissions as a form of air pollution under the CAA, then it must be because of the 
adverse impact on the U.S. from global warming.  However, unlike traditional air 
pollutants, which are a local public bad everywhere, ghg emissions are not an economic 
bad everywhere within the United States.  Indeed, there is a large body of economic 
evidence which suggests that in the short to medium term (up to at least 2050), for many 
regions within the United States, the climate changes induced by the accumulation of C02 
and other ghg’s in the atmosphere (troposphere) will generate net benefits, rather than net 
costs.  For such regions, climate change will be an economic good, not an economic bad.  
                                                 
35 Title VI of the CAA, “Stratospheric Ozone Protection,” is found at 42 U.S.C. §§7671-7671q.  As lucidly 
explained by Richard Elliot Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy: New Directions in Safeguarding the Planet 
(1991) U.S. companies such as Du Pont did not actively oppose the phase-out of the most serious ozone 
depleting refrigerants, at least relative to their European competitors, in large part because they achieved 
leadership in producing substitutes.   
36 Indeed, it was only after Congress added a separate and quite different program – the Title IV Acid Rain 
trading program – that the CAA successfully addressed even a regional air pollution problem.  The acid 
rain problem was not even discussed by Congress until after the 1977 Amendments.  In Congress acid rain 
control starkly pitted the interests of some regions of the country against others, with politicians from 
northern and northeastern states recounting the damage done to their states’ lakes rivers and forests from 
acid rain, while those from Midwestern and Appalachian coal-producing states argued that there was not 
sufficient evidence that coal was the problem. Support for tougher sulfur dioxide emission limits came 
from Representatives and Senators from states in the northeast; opposition came from Congressional 
members from states in the Midwest and Appalachia that produced coal with a high sulfur content. 
Throughout the 1980’s, Congress remained deadlocked on the issue, and resolution did not come until 
strong Presidential leadership helped usher in the cost-effective compromise represented by the acid rain 
trading program of Title IV in the 1990 Amendments.  Bailey, Congress and Air Pollution, supra note __ at 
___. 18 
The CAA has nothing to do with the regulation of “pollution” that is likely to be a short 
to medium term economic good for many regions of the United States.  
 It is of course true that in the longer term (late twenty-first century and beyond), 
that if ghg emissions do not decline or at least stabilize, climate changes are possible 
which will in fact harm most regions of the United States.  However, there is so much 
uncertainty associated with such long-term climate change that it is very difficult to 
imagine how the CAA could possibly be interpreted as intended to regulate such long 
term, and highly uncertain harms from climate change. My argument is thus if global 
warming will generate a variegated pattern of costs and benefits to the U.S., with only 
some regions of the country being net losers from global warming in the short to medium 
term, then the legislative bargain that sustained mandatory emissions standards for 
automobile emissions in the CAA cannot by any reasonable stretch of the imagination be 
interpreted to extend to mandatory emission standards for carbon dioxide.   
 
C. The Short to Medium Term Benefits to the U.S. from a Warmer (and Generally 
Wetter) Climate  
  
  In the short to medium term – by which I mean the twenty-first century – average 
daily temperature increases in the 2-3 degree centigrade range
37 will almost surely 
generate net benefits in many areas of the United States.
38  Most directly and most surely, 
a warmer climate with milder winters will confer a very large amenity benefit: economic 
studies have consistently shown that people are willing to pay a premium to live in places 
with warmer weather.  Somewhat less certain benefits from a warmer and wetter climate 
include boosts to agricultural production and health benefits from milder winters.  Much 
less certain, but possible, is the possibility that by increasing the frequency of El Nino 
                                                 
37 Temperature increases in this range are predicted for the end of the century (2070-2090) for so-called 
“business as usual” (no carbon tax) scenarios (the IPCC’s A1F1 scenario and the A2 scenario) by two of 
the most widely used OACGM’s, the Hadley Centre’s 3
rd OAGCM and NCAR’s Climate System Model 3.  
See Olivier Deschênes and Michael Greenstone, Climate Change, Mortality, and Adaptation: Evidence 
from Annual Fluctuations in Weather in the U.S. 3, 39 (MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy 
Research Working Paper No. 07-007, June  2007). 
38 I am not alone in this empirical observation, but this is to my knowledge the first time that the various 
evidence has been summarized for legal policymaking.  See Cass R. Sunstein, The Complex Climate 
Change Incentives of China and the United States 11, 12 (AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory 
Studies, WP 07-14)(observing that even with a worst case 3 degree centigrade increase in global mean 
temperature, the U.S. will face relatively little cost from climate change, while Russia is actually expected 
to benefit from such a temperature increase).  19 
events, global warming will reduce the cost of hurricanes to the U.S.  Of course, global 
warming may also increase the severity of coastal storms.  Storms are of course costly, 
but recent empirical work shows that due to continuing adaptation, there has been a 
steady and rapid decline in U.S. losses from coastal and other natural hazards.  Here I 
briefly review the evidence on all of these points.  
 
1. The amenity value of a warming U.S. climate  
 
The amenity value that people attach to different climatic regimes is hardly a new 
topic.  It has been intensively studied for decades by public finance and urban 
economists.  Climate varies with location, and there are very important and intensively 
studied markets – for real estate and for jobs – which carry information about the value 
that people attach to different locations and hence different climates.  It is well known 
that both wages and salaries and home prices vary a great deal with location.  For 
example, in 2006, the median price of an existing single family home in the most 
expensive U.S. markets, such as San Francisco and Boston, was many, many times what 
the median price was in Midwestern and Rocky Mountain metropolitan areas such as 
Cincinnati, Cleveland, Denver and Des Moines.
39  Now of course locations vary in lots of 
dimensions other than climate that economists predict would determine median home 
prices and wages, such as median income and wealth, unemployment rate, and the quality 
of local schools.
40  Some of these predictions – such as the prediction that metropolitan 
areas with higher median income should also have higher median home prices – have 
been difficult for economists to empirically corroborate.
41  But what the studies have 
consistently found is a result of striking importance for the normative evaluation of 
alternative climates: that people have a strong and robust willingness to pay for local 
                                                 
39 As reported by the National Association of Realtors, median sales prices of existing single family homes 
as of the third quarter of 2006 for the exemplar cities in the text ranged from $749,000 and $412,000 for 
San Francisco and Boston, respectively, to $253,000 for Denver, $145,000 for Des Moines and Cincinnati 
and $139,000 for Cleveland.  See data reported at www.realtor.org/Research.nsf/Pages/MetroPrice.  For 
data on interurban wage variation, see Jennifer Roback, Wages, Rents and the Quality of Life, 90 J. Pol. 
Econ. 1257 (1982).   
40 For an introduction to the methods that economists have developed to isolate the effect of particular 
locational variables on market values, see Roger Palmquist, Property Value Models, in Handbook of 
Environmental Economics  __ (Karl-Goran Maler and J. Vincent, eds. 2004). 
41 Results summarized and analyzed by Michael J. Potepan, Explaining Intermetropolitan Variation in 
Housing Prices, Rents and Land Prices, 24 Real Estate Econ. 219, 219-223 (1996). 20 
climates that are “mild.”
42
That people value mild climates has been a consistent finding in the literature for 
over at least the past two decades.  Some recent studies give some concrete dollar figures 
for just how much people value climate mildness, and also clarify how demographic 
differences in age and education effect how people value different aspects of climate 
“mildness.” In a carefully constructed study using extensive micro data on households, 
Cragg and Kahn found that both college educated and non-college educated Americans 
place a very high value on climate, with the attribute most valued being warmer winters 
(measured by average February temperature).
43 They found that college graduates were 
willing to pay $1200 for a 10.4° (or one standard deviation) increase in average February 
temperature, with older college grads (aged 50-60) willing to pay even more, $10,000, 
and non-college graduates in the same age group willing to pay still more, $60,000, for 
warmer winters.
44  As income typically increases with age, Cragg and Kahn take the 
strong positive age dependency of climate valuation to indicate that climate is a normal 
good – that is, that demand for climactic mildness increases with income.
45 Other 
attributes of climatic mildness were also valued: college grads aged 50-60, for example, 
were willing to pay $4400 for one standard deviation less rain, $5800 for one standard 
deviation lower July temperature, and $3900 for one standard deviation less humidity.
46  
Other studies have used different measures of climate mildness.  For example, in 
                                                 
42 See, for example, Glenn C. Blomquist, et. Al., New Estimates of Quality of Life in Urban Areas, 78 
Amer. Econ. Rev. 89 (1988); Joseph Gyourko and Joseph E. Tracy, The Structure of Local Public Finance 
and the Quality of Life, 99 J. Pol. Econ. 774 (1991)(who find that while precipitation, humidity, sunshine 
and cooling degree days are statistically insignificant, heating degree days is significant, with an estimated 
annual full price – lower housing prices but higher earnings – of living in a cold climate of $22.58 for each 
one per cent rise in heating degree days). There are various definitions of climatic “mildness.” Compare, 
for example, Blomquist et. Al. , Gyourko and Tracy, and Roback, with Potepan, supra note __ at 243 and 
Christopher A. Manning, Explaining Intercity Home Price Differences, 2 J. Real Estate Fin. & Econ. 131, 
141 (1989). But as discussed below, text infra at note __, the finding that climate is significant and that in 
particular people have high willingness to pay for a mild, warm climate is consistent, regardless of the 
particular measure of climactic mildness used.  In addition to Roback, see Sherwin Rosen, Wage Based 
Indexes of the Urban Quality of Life, in Current Issues in Urban Economics 74, __ (Peter Mieszkowski and 
Nahlon Straszheim, eds. 1979); Stephen M. Renas and Rishi Kumar, Climatic Conditions and Migration: 
An Econometric Inquiry, Annals of Regional Science 69, 76 (1983)(finding that people tend to migrate 
toward areas with relatively mild climates); Philip E. Graves, Migration and Climate, 20 J. Regional Sci. 
227, __ (1980).  
43 Michael I. Cragg and Matthew E. Kahn, New Estimates of Climate Demand: Evidence from Location 
Choice, 42 J. Urban Econ. 261, 277 (1997). 
44 Cragg and Kahn, New Estimates, at 277-278. 
45 Cragg and Kahn, New Estimates, at 278. 
46 Cragg and Kahn, New Estimates, at 278. 21 
his study of intermetropolitan area variation in house prices, Manning
47 used as his   
climate mildness variable the index of climate mildness published in the Rand McNally 
Places Rate Almanac.
48On this index, the “best” (that is, highest scoring on climate 
“mildness”) climates are California coastal Mediterranean places such as San Francisco, 
followed by snowless Pacific Northwest climates, desert climates (Yuma, Arizona, for 
instance, ranks very high on this index), beach climates (mainly in Florida), and long-hot-
summer climates (such as is found in central Texas).  Indeed, the top fifty climates are all 
either in the Sunbelt or on ocean coastlines.    
Studies of how climate (and weather) effect inter-regional migration and wage 
variation have used different measures of climate and have, but like the studies of climate 
and house prices, the migration and wage studies have consistently found that climate is 
very important in explaining interregional migration and wage variation.
49 Roback’s path 
breaking application of the hedonic pricing approach generated not only the general result 
that regional wage differences could be explained “largely” by variations in local 
amenities, but that climate was a “remarkably” important amenity.
50 She found that 
people view a cold, snowy and cloudy local climate as a very strong disamenity, for 
which they demand compensation in the form of higher wages, while the number of 
sunny days was by contrast a very powerful amenity, lowering the wage that employers 
must pay to attract employees. 
51  Studies of migration have generally painted a similar 
picture, finding for example that people migrate away from places with climates that are 
severe in the sense of having a large variation between summer maximums and winter 
minimums.
52
Especially given the fact that varying climate measures are used, the consistent 
finding from the economic literature on intermetropolitan variation in house prices, 
                                                 
47 See Manning, supra note __. 
48 See Places Rated Almanac __ (Savageau and Boyer 1993). Using 30 year weather data to measure local 
climate, this index begins with 1000 points and subtracts points for the number of very hot and very cold 
months, the number of heating and cooling degree days, and the number of freezing, zero degree, and 90 
degree days. 
49 See Graves, Migration and Climate, supra note __ at 233; Roback, supra note __ at 1270. 
50 Roback, supra note __ at 1270. 
51 Roback, supra note __ at 1270. 
52 Graves, Migration and Climate, supra note __ at 233. Interestingly, as does the study by Cragg and Kahn 
discussed earlier, text supra at notes __ to __,  Graves also found that response to climate is highly age 
dependent, finding, for example, that warmth (defined as average annual cooling degree days) is a big draw 
for people older than 55 but is of (statistical) insignificance to younger people. 22 
wages and migration -- that people are willing to pay significantly more for houses and to 
work for significantly less in locations that have relatively warm climates – is quite 
remarkable.  That same literature reveals that what people dislike in a climate is large 
seasonal variation in temperature and precipitation, especially when that variation means 
cold and snowy winters.   If the ensemble of OACGM models used by the IPCC are 
correct in predicting that climate change will mean that many regions of the U.S. will be 
warmer, especially in the winter, then for such regions, climate change may bring 
precisely the kind of climate that people like.  Rather than a place to flee from, northern 
regions of the country may be a place that people migrate toward.  Moreover, those 
regions that are predicted to become both warmer and much more subject to drought 
(such as the Southeast) may indeed suffer declines in agricultural yield, but they will also 
resemble more the desert metropolitan areas that, as the economic literature predicts, are 
currently the fastest growing areas in the entire U.S.
53
It is true that people in regions with warmer and hence more desirable climates 
will not enjoy a free lunch.  On the margin, areas with warmer, more desirable climates 
will attract more immigrants (and lose fewer emigrants) and therefore housing prices in 
such places will tend to rise relative to places with worsening climates.
54  Of course, 
insofar as global warming may mean that most places in the United States will have 
milder winters, the value of a mild winter will tend to fall (by the basic law of supply and 
demand).    Moreover, the effects of a warming climate are not expected to be positive 
everywhere: places that are now quite cold would increase in value by more than average, 
whereas hot places could decrease in value.
55  Still, moderate (2 degree centigrade) 
climate change will have generated what is essentially a large scale local public good: a 
“free” warming of local climates (free in the sense that it was not paid for in local taxes) 
                                                 
53 As reported by Sam Roberts, Census Reports Arizona County Still has Biggest Growth, New York 
Times, March 22, 2007, A18, the most recent census data reveals that nine of the ten U.S. counties with the 
biggest population gains over the 2000-2006 period were in the south or west, with half of those with the 
biggest gains located in Texas; the biggest absolute population increase was in Maricopa County in Arizona 
(growing by 700,000 people since 2000, or by more than the population of all but 15 American cities), and 
the largest growth rate was in Flagler County in northeast Florida, with growth of 67% since 2000.   
54 A point made by Matthew E. Kahn, Environmental Valuation Using Cross-City Hedonic Methods 5 
(Draft of June, 2004) (but not in the forthcoming, publication version).  
55 Robert Mendelsohn, A Hedonic Study of the Non-Market Impacts of Global Warming in the U.S., in 
David Maddison, The Amenity Value of the Global Climate 93, 104 (2001). 23 
that may be worth as much as $75 billion dollars.
56
And even this number may be an underestimate.  Recent evidence shows that over 
time, the value of climate (as with other public goods) has been increasing.
57   Between 
1940 and 1990, the U.S. population moved south and west, and wealthier and older 
people with the means to “buy” warmer climate through their locational choices clearly 
did so.
58 Cragg and Kahn find that whereas in 1960 and 1970, places with warmer 
February temperatures actually had lower real estate rental prices, but 1990, warm 
February temperatures were capitalized into higher real estate rents.
59 In related work, 
Costa and Kahn
60 find that whereas in 1970, a person would have had to pay $1,288 (in 
1990 dollars) to buy San Francisco’s climate instead of Chicago’s, by 1990 this 
differential had increased to $7,547.
61 In summary, recent empirical findings indicate that 
over the time period 1940-1990, the price of warm climate (measured by February 





2. Health and recreational benefits to the U.S. from a warming climate  
 
The relationship between climate – and especially temperature – and human 
morbidity and mortality is not a new topic, having been studied for over a century.
63  In 
industrialized countries, mortality peaks in the winter, mainly from noncommunicable 
                                                 
56 Mendelsohn, A Hedonic Study of the Non-Market Impacts of Global Warming, supra note ___ at 105. 
57 For evidence on the general secular increase in the valuation of local public goods including climate, see 
Dora Costa and Matthew E. Kahn, The Rising Price of Non-Market Goods, 93 Amer. Econ. Rev. 227 
(Papers & Proceed. May 2003). 
58 Michael I. Cragg and Matthew E. Kahn, Climate Consumption and Climate Pricing from 1940 to 1990, 
29 Regional Sci. & Urban Econ. 519, 522 (1999). 
59Michael I. Cragg and Matthew E. Kahn, Climate Consumption and Climate Pricing from 1940 to 1990, 
29 Regional Sci. & Urban Econ. 519, 529 (1999). Somewhat non-intuitively, they also find that across the 
entire 1940-1990 period, humidity was positively capitalized into rents. 
60 Costa and Kahn, The Rising Price of Non-Market Goods, supra note __ at __. 
61 Kahn, Environmental Valuation Using Cross-City Hedonic Methods, supra note __ at 10. 
62 Cragg and Kahn, Climate Consumption, supra note __ at 532.  The exception seems to be for southern 
earnings, which have not fallen.  As noted below, text infra at note __, this is likely a function of air 
conditioning, which has significantly increased labor productivity in the south.  It is worth noting that the 
preference for warm and sunny climates is not limited to U.S. households, but is a robust and highly 
statistically significant finding of studies of many other countries: indeed, Maddison, The Amenity Value 
of the Global Climate, supra note __ at 35, concludes that “most of the countries of Europe and North 
America” would “benefit substantially” from an increase in temperature.    
63 National Academy of Sciences, Policy Implications of Greenhouse Warming, supra note __ at 616. 24 
diseases (such as heart disease).
64 This suggests that the warmer, wetter conditions 
predicted for the northern region of the U.S. will not only means enhanced agricultural 
productivity for that region but also (as with El Nino events discussed below), a likely not 
insubstantial reduction in lives lost due to severe winter weather.
65
That a warmer climate, with milder winters, will bring clear health benefits to the 
U.S. is buttressed by recent work showing how in the United States, heat-related 
mortality has steadily declined over the period from the 1960’s to the late 1990’s, with an 
average number of excess deaths on hot and humid days dropping (for a sample of 28 
major American cities) from 41 during the 1960’s-1970’s to a little over 10 in the 
1990’s.
66 A number of factors seem to account for the secular decrease in heat-related 
mortality in the U.S. since the 1960’s: improvements in medical care and technologies, 
improved public health systems that warn people about coming heat waves, and even 
human biophysical acclimatization to high temperatures.
67 Perhaps most striking and 
significant, however, has been the impact of air-conditioning.  By the 1980’s, many cities 
in the southern United States (e.g. Houston, Miami, Charlotte) had no elevated mortality 
on hot and humid days, and over the entire period from the 1960’s to the 1990’s, the 
impact of hot and humid days on mortality was weakest in cities in the southern U.S. – 
the warmest and most humid cities, but also places where air conditioning use is most 
                                                 
64 Most recently, perhaps, Oliver Deschênes and Enrico Moretti, Extreme Weather Events, Mortality and 
Migration, NBER Working Paper No. 13227, July, 2007, find “evidence of a large and statistically 
significant effect on mortality within a month of [a] cold wave.  This effect appears to be larger than the 
immediate effect, possibly because it takes take time for health conditions associated with extreme cold to 
manifest themselves and to spread.” See also National Academy of Sciences, Policy Implications of 
Greenhouse Warming, supra note __ at 616, citing W. H. Wiehe, Climate, Health and Disease, in 
Proceedings of the World Climate Conference, Geneva, 1979.  See also Robert E. Davis, ET. Al., Changing 
Heat-Related Mortality in the United States, 111 Envl. Health Persp. 1712, 1713 (2003).  For some specific 
studies, see, for example, G. Laschewski and G. Jendritzky, Effects of the Thermal Environment on Human 
Health: An Investigation of 30 years of daily mortality data from Southwest Germany, 21 Clim. Res. 91 
(2002), A. Lerchl, Changes in the Seasonality of Mortality in Germany from 1946 to 1995: The Role of 
Temperature, 42 Int’l. J. Biometeorol. 84 (1998).   In developing countries, by contrast, mortality peaks in 
the summer, primarily from infectious diseases. National Academy of Sciences, Policy Implications of 
Greenhouse Warming, supra note __ at 616, citing W. H. Wiehe, Climate, Health and Disease, in 
Proceedings of the World Climate Conference, Geneva, 1979.   
65 Although the causes are not yet understood, in “nearly all cities examined globally,” winter mortality is 
“much higher” than summer mortality.  Robert E. Davis, Climate Change and Human Health, in Patrick J. 
Michaels, ed., Shattered Consensus: The True State of Global Warming 183, 191 (2005).  Hence lives lost 
to global warming – induced summer excess heat events might be outweighed by lives saved due to global 
warming – induced warmer winters.  Id.  
66 Davis, et.  al., Changing Heat-Related Mortality, supra note __ at 1714. 
67 Davis, et. al., Changing Heat-Related Mortality, supra note __ at 1715. 25 
widespread.
68 Indeed, reflecting the huge impact of air conditioning in allowing people to 
consume warm winters without suffering so much from hot and humid summers, Cragg 
and Kahn find that while in 1960 workers were compensated in the form of higher 
earnings for living in places with hot summers, by 1990 there was no compensating wage 
differential for living in such hot and humid places.
69
Of course, to accurately measure the impact of weather on health in the U.S., one 
must control for the massive population shift to the better-adapted southern states that has 
occurred over the last thirty years.
70  Even using two GCM’s that predict a huge increase 
over the 2070-2099 period in very hot days
71 but very little decline in the number of very 
cold days,
72 a recent study that does precisely this finds that for most demographic groups 
in the U.S., there will be no statistically significant increase in mortality due to such 
temperature increases.
73 Moreover, the estimated mortality functions in this study are U-
shaped, with mortality highest at the very warmest and coldest daily (mean) temperatures.  
The estimated temperature-mortality relationship implies that under alternative but 
plausible climate change scenarios, where warming is concentrated most in the coldest 
months, warming would lead to a “substantial” reduction in mortality.
74
This evidence does not imply that everyone can equally adapt to a warming 
climate,
75 and nor does it imply that adaptation is costless.
76 What it shows is that for the 
                                                 
68 Davis et. al., Changing Heat-Related Mortality, supra note __ at 1715-1716.  Perhaps the most striking 
figure on the impact of air conditioning is the finding by studies of the impact of air conditioning on 
mortality during the 1995 Chicago heat wave, such as N.Y. Chan et. al., An Empirical Mechanistic 
Framework for Heat-Related Illness, 16 Clim. Res. 133 (2001), that moving from an unventilated indoor 
location to air conditioning reduced individual mortality risk by a factor of 5 or 6 (that is, 500% - 600%). 
69 Michael I. Cragg and Matthew E. Kahn, Climate Consumption and Climate Pricing from 1940 to 1990, 
29 Regional Sci. & Urban Econ. 519, 522 (1999). 
Climate Consumption, supra note __ at 528-529. 
70 As reported by Olivier Deschênes and Michael Greenstone, Climate Change, Mortality, and Adaptation: 
Evidence from Annual Fluctuations in Weather in the U.S. 21 (MIT Center for Energy and Environmental 
Policy Research Working Paper No. 07-007, June  2007), over the period 1968 to 2002, for example, 
Arizona’s population increased by 223%, compared to just 124% for other states in its Census Division. 
71 For the U.S. an increase in the average number of days with a mean daily temperature above 90 degrees 
from just 1.7 now to 44.  Deschênes and Greenstone, Climate Change, Mortality and Adaptation, supra note 
__ at 21. 
72 For the U.S., an average decline of only 3-8 days with mean temperature below 30 degrees Fahrenheit.  
Deschênes and Greenstone, supra note __ at 21.  
73 Deschênes and Greenstone, supra note __ at 26. 
74 Deschênes and Greenstone, supra note __ at 27. 
75 Deschênes and Greenstone, Climate Change, Mortality and Adaptation, supra note __ at 25, find, 
importantly, that the vast increase in very hot days predicted by the Hadley Centre GCM (Third version) 26 
average resident of developed, industrialized countries, a warmer climate will bring net 
health benefits rather than any significant health costs.
77
In the U.S., a warmer climate will likely not only bring health benefits, but also 
quite sizeable recreational benefits.   Early studies of the impact of climate warming in 
the 2.5 degree centigrade range focused on skiing and unsurprisingly found that a warmer 
climate would mean a potentially large decrease in ski days and a correspondingly large 
welfare loss.
78  But skiing is of relative economic insignificance compared to 
summertime recreational activities such as boating, camping, fishing, golfing, hunting 
and wildlife viewing, with only $2.5 bill spent annually on skiing compared to $76 billion 
on the summertime activities.
79  With either a modest 2.5-centigrade increase, or even 
larger 5 degree centigrade increase in temperature, recent economic work estimates very 
large net recreational benefits from global warming in the U.S., with net benefits perhaps 






3. Market adaptation to extreme weather events and the continuing increase in value and 
decreased human risk in U.S. coastal locations  
 
As just discussed, air conditioning has proven to be an enormously effective 
adaptation in allowing residents of very warm southern and southwestern regions of the 
U.S. to enjoy the benefits of a warm climate will lessening the adverse health 
consequences from heat waves.  It may well be pointed out that many models of climate 
                                                                                                                                                 
and NCAR’s GCM would cause an increase the infant mortality rate, by 5.5% for females and 7.8% for 
males. 
76 Indeed, Deschênes and Greenstone, Climate Change, Mortality and Adaptation, supra note __ at 33-34, 
predicted that as people adapt to climate change by installing more air conditioning, switching fuels and 
redesigning buildings, there will be a statistically significant increase in energy consumption of between 15 
and 35%. 
77 What this means in terms of sheer numbers of lives saved is indicated by Thomas Gale Moore, Health 
and Amenity Effects of Global Warming 5, 8 (1996), available at 
http://www.stanford.edu/~moore/health.html, who estimates (based on studies of mortality in Washington 
D.C. and in 89 large U.S. counties) that a 2.5 degee centigrade rise in average U.S. temperatures would cut 
annual deaths by between 37,000 and 41,000. 
78 See the discussion in Robert Mendelsohn and Marla Markowski, The Impact of Climate Change on 
Outdoor Recreation, in The Impact of Climate Change on the United States Economy 267, 268 (2004 
edition). 
79 Mendelsohn and Markowski, supra note __ at 268. 
80 Mendelsohn and Markowski, supra note __ at 283. 27 
change predict that in most parts of the U.S., a warmer and wetter climate will also be 
much stormier, with an increase in the frequency of torrential rains, tornadoes and similar 
severe weather.  The models do not predict future widespread Mediterranean mildness in 
the U.S., it may be said, but rather something like a much stormier and more 
unpredictable version of the climate that now prevails in the Southeastern U.S.  Finally, 
the critic may stress that global warming will also entail rising sea levels (due both to the 
direct effect of a warmer atmosphere and hence oceans and to melting ice caps) and 
increasingly severe hurricanes, developments that will make the mild, coastal climates 
that Americans now seem to most prefer much less attractive places to live. 
Let us assume that the criticism stated a moment ago is correct: that even if 
climate change makes much of the U.S. warmer and less snowy and more attractive to 
many people, it will also make ocean coastal areas much more subject to hurricanes and 
coastal storms.  A very basic economic prediction is that as people come to expect 
increased storms in certain locations, they will come to subtract the expected loss due to 
such storms from the price they are willing to pay for homes.
81  There is evidence for 
such rational discounting of home prices.
82  There is also evidence for the related and 
equally plausible conjecture that even for hurricanes, one or two occurrences of such a 
storm event does not cause people to immediately evaluate upward their expected loss.  
Rather, it may take a somewhat sustained increase in the number of such random natural 
disasters before people decide that the probability of such a disaster has increased and for 
them to consequently increase their estimated expected losses, and to (permanently) 
discount the price they are willing to pay for homes in locations that have been subject to 
such repeat strikes.
83
                                                 
81 Colin Camerer and Howard Kunreuther, Decision Processes for Law Probability Events: Policy 
Implications, 8 J. Policy Anal. Manage. 565 (1989), have argued that hurricanes and other catastrophic 
natural disasters are precisely the sort of low probability – vast harm events that people have difficulty in 
rationally, quantitatively evaluating.  Theirs is an alternative explanation of empirical findings, discussed 
below, that people do not discount by much the price they are willing to pay for housing in locations 
subject to such risks.  
82 D.N. MacDonald, J.C. Murdoch and H.L. White, Uncertain Hazards, Insurance and Consumer Choice: 
Evidence, 63 Land Econ. 361 (1987).  
83 J. Edward Graham, Jr. and William H. Hall, Jr., Hurricanes, Housing Market Activity, and Coastal Real 
Estate Values, 69 Appraisal J. 379, 385-386 (2001).  Looking at the same natural hazard realization – the 
series of hurricanes and storms that struck the Cape Fear Region of North Carolina ending in 1999 – J. 
Edward Graham and William W. Wall, Catastrophic Risk and Behavior of Residential Real Estate Market 
Participants, 3 Natural Haz. Rev. 92, 96 (2002) use different measures of market reaction – the spread 28 
Still, the risk of loss from hurricanes and similar severe storms is a decided 
expected cost to people who live in such storm prone places.  But hurricanes and other 
coastal storms are the downside of living in coastal locations; for many people, despite 
this downside, living near the coast seems to be worth more and more.  Since the 1960’s, 
the coastal population in the U.S. has grown at more than double the national growth rate, 
and over the last 50 years, the value of coastal real estate has appreciated at an average 
7% per year over the last 50 years, with waterfront property worth up to 45% more than 
comparable inland property.
84 Even with an arguably vast expansion in popular 
knowledge about the risks of living in coastal areas, the market value of living on the 
coast has increased spectacularly.  Indeed, recent empirical evidence shows while in 
mainland housing markets, location in a 100 or even 500 year floodplain lowers property 
values, for property on the Outer Banks of North Carolina (one of the most hurricane-
prone areas in the U.S.), location within a 100 or 500 year floodplain actually increases 
property value.
85 Indeed, Outer Banks properties within the 100-year floodplain with 
wave exposure – which are ocean front properties (as opposed to properties facing 
Pimlico Sound) – command a 26.5 per cent locational premium.
86
That Americans have increasingly high willingness to pay for coastal locations 
such as the Outer Banks is only part of the explanation for why they are willing to pay 
ever-higher prices for such scarce locations, despite their very high relative risk of loss 
from hurricanes and other storms.  Another important reason for increasing coastal land 
values is that hurricanes and other natural disasters are simply becoming less dangerous 
                                                                                                                                                 
between listing and selling price, average days on the market, and monthly sales.  This study’s main result, 
that the spread between asking and selling prices increased by 8% after the fourth and final hurricane strike, 
also tends to support the earlier finding that this series of storms eventually caused people to revise upward 
their perceived probability of such storms.  
84 Okmyung Bin and Jamie Brown Kruse, Real Estate Market Response to Coastal Flood Hazards, 7 
Natural Haz. Rev. 137 (2006); see also Joseph J. Cordes and Anthony M.J. Yezer, In Harm’s Way: Does 
Federal Spending on Beach Enhancement and Protection Induce Excessive Development in Coastal Areas?, 
74 Land Econ. 128 (1998)(finding that in the 42 Atlantic and Gulf beachfront communities they sampled 
from the Maine-Texas coastline,  the average annual rate of growth in housing units from 1960 to 1992 was 
3.9 per cent, a rate of growth more than 50 per cent higher than the national growth rate of approximately 
2.4 per cent).    
85 Biin and Kruse, 7 Nat. Haz. Rev. 137, 141.  For another study finding that floodplain location lowers 
property values in inland areas (in this study, an area near Gainesville, Florida), see David M. Harrison, 
Greg T. Smersh and Arthur L. Schwartz, Jr., Environmental Determinants of Housing Prices: The Impact 
of Flood Zone Status, 21 J. Real Estate Res. 3 (2001). 
86 Bin and Kruse, 7 Nat. Haz. Rev. 137, 141.  29 
to human life and therefore less likely to cause discounting of coastal properties.
87  
Studying a relatively broad set of natural disasters, Kahn found that the average number 
of deaths per disaster fell an average of 4.6% per year over the period 1970-2001.
88  Just 
as air conditioning reduced the discomfort from the south’s warm and humid climate, 
stimulating labor productivity in and hence migration to the southern U.S.,
89 so too have 
advances in weather forecasting, communications, construction and transportation 
infrastructure significantly decreased the cost, and hence increased the expected net 
value, from living in warm, humid but storm-prone coastal locations.
90  Given both the 
increasing value and decreasing expected cost from living in coastal locations, were 
climate change to generate a net increase in the supply of such locations, then it might 
generate a very, very large increase in social welfare as measured by market prices.   
Hence on this analysis, a crucial question for climate change research should be whether 
by warming the atmosphere and seas, global warming may generate a net increase the 
                                                 
87 Indeed, the list of natural hazard adaptation measures  available to developed countries such as the 
United States includes at least the following: “early warning systems and large scale evacuation, disaster 
insurance, reforestation, soil conservation, mangrove replantation and other natural defenses; strengthen 
docks, harbor facilities, and telecommunications and satellite systems; build protective barriers for sea 
surges and water diversion channels; fortify drainage, irrigation and water supply, and sanitation 
infrastructure, organized relocation efforts and ‘managed retreats’; smooth recovery for firms and sectors 
suffering serious losses; enforce efficient zoning regulations; administer public health and educational 
services; and offer emergency treatment for victims.” J. Timmons Roberts and Bradley C. Parks, A Climate 
of Injustice: Global Inequality, Northh-south Politics, and Climate Policy 111 (2007). 
88 Matthew E. Kahn, Two Measures of Progress in Adapting to Climate Change, 13 Global Envl. Change 
307, 309 (2003).  Kahn’s list of natural disasters included earthquakes, extremes of heat and cold, floods, 
and a broad “wind storm” category that included hurricanes, storms, tornadoes, tropical storms, typhoons 
and winter storms. Id. at 308.  
89Among other evidence for adaptation to warmer climates is the evidence on southern earnings presented 
by Cragg and Kahn, supra note __ at 534-535, evidence that while people’s willingness to pay for a warm 
climate has increased over the period 1960-1990, southern earnings have not fallen (as would be expected 
from rising demand for warm climate, as people accepted lower earnings  in order to live in warm 
climates). The coincidence of both rising earnings and employment in the south is generally ascribed to the 
adoption of the air conditioner, a form of adaptation to hot and humid summers that had a remarkably large 
impact in increasing labor productivity. Walter Oi, Welfare Implications of Invention, in The Economics of 
New Goods __ (Timothy Bresnehan et. al. eds. 1997)(recounting how air conditioning rates in the south 
rose from 58% to 91% over the 1970 to 1990 period versus only from 44 to 70% nationally.) 
90 Especially with the federally subsidized coastal flood insurance programs discussed earlier, for the 
individual coastal property owner, the amount risked per dollar invested has almost surely fallen over the 
time period 1960 to 1990.  How much of this decrease in individual loss exposure is due to subsidized 
insurance, versus adaptive construction standards, is difficult to determine.   Note that there is no 
inconsistency between a reduction due to adaptation in an individual coastal property owner’s risk of loss 
from floods and hurricanes and the increase in the total losses from hurricanes and other coastal storms so 
clearly documented by Roger A. Pielke, Jr. and Christopher W. Landsea, Normalized Hurricane Damages 
in the United States: 1925-1995, 13 Weather and Forecasting 621 (1998).    Indeed, by lowering individual 
cost, programs like federal disaster relief and federal flood insurance stimulate demand for coastal 
properties and increase the total developed value at risk in coastal areas.    30 
supply of such risky but nonetheless highly desirable coastal locations.
91
 
4. Global warming will either boost the U.S. agricultural sector or have minimal effects  
 
A relatively well-known benefit to the U.S. (and Canada will have an even bigger 
benefit of this sort) from global warming is a likely increase in agricultural productivity.  
This is recognized even by the IPCC, which grudgingly recently conceded that during the 
rapid warming that occurred during the period 1970-2000, corn yield in the U.S. Midwest 
increased 20%, and that warmer nights have “enhanced the production of high-quality 
wine grapes.”
92  Unsurprisingly, the IPCC’s discussion just hints at the possible benefits.  
A recent and comprehensive study of the impact of climate change on U.S. agriculture 
has found an increase in economic welfare of between $.8 - $7.8 billion in 2030 and 
between $3.2 - $12.2 billion in 2090, depending upon which of two models of climate 
change is used.
93   These welfare gains are driven by massive predicted increases in 
aggregate U.S. agricultural productivity, and although U.S. producers may suffer income 
losses (if market prices fall because U.S. productivity increases are not offset by 
declining production elsewhere in the world), lower agricultural prices are predicted to 
make American consumers better off to the tune of between $2.5 and $13 billion in 
2090.
94  Even more strikingly, under the widely used Hadley Center GCM model, 
agricultural production is predicted to increase for all regions of the U.S. in both 2030 
and 2090.
95  Finally, with agricultural production predicted to shift to regions that will not 
                                                 
91 Even taking as given the generally-agreed upon predictions that global warming will increase mean 
temperature, lessen seasonal swings and also increase storminess, it is possible that the answer to my 
question is “no,” because increased temperature and lower seasonal variation does nothing to increase the 
supply of places with really beautiful beaches and the other characteristics that make the Outer Banks and 
similar coastal areas valuable.  For an idea of the variety of value-determining characteristics, see James R. 
Rinehart, Jeffrey J. Pompe, Adjusting the Market Value of Coastal Property for Beach Quality, __ 
Appraisal J. 604 (1994); Earl D. Benson, Julia L. Hansen, and Arthur L. Schwartz, Jr., Water Views and 
Residential Property Values, ___ Appraisal J. 260 (2000). 
92 C.B. Field, et. al., North America, in Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability.  
Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC 617, 624 (M.L. Parry, et. 
al., eds. 2007). 
93 J. Reilly, et. al., U.S. Agriculture and Climate Change: New Results, 57 Climatic Change 43, 56 (2003). 
94 J. Reilly, et. al., 57 Climatic Change at 56. 
95 J. Reilly, et. al., 57 Climatic Change at 57.  Under a different general circulation model (GCM) of 
climate change run by Reilly et. al., the large predicted net aggregate gain in U.S. agricultural product 
results from very large gains in some regions (the Great Lakes states, the cornbelt, the mountain states and 
the Pacific northwest) and quite severe declines in others (the southeast and southern plains) The difference 
between the two GCM’s is not only in the temperatures they predict for different regions under increasing 
C02, but – and most importantly for agricultural production – in the amount of rainfall they predict.   31 
only be warmer but also much wetter, Reilly et. Al. find a very strong shift in 
comparative economic advantage away from irrigated cropping and toward dryland, and 
with a much smaller yield advantage to be gained from irrigation, they find that irrigation 
is no longer economically viable in many areas.
96 With many areas of the country 
historically drawing down groundwater supplies at unsustainable rates to supply the 
water demand of both agriculture and growing urban populations, the decrease in 
agricultural demand for groundwater predicted by Reilly et. Al. is a significant potential 
environmental benefit. 
The ability of farmers to adapt quickly to changing climate conditions is indeed a 
crucial factor in driving U.S. agricultural benefits from global warming.  The best way to 
empirically estimate how farmers will adapt to generally warmer conditions is by looking 
at how they have already adapted to the very large existing climatic variations in the U.S.  
Such studies – which are based on real, cross sectional data and estimate statistically the 
actual relationship between agricultural land prices, climatic, economic and soil variables  
– essentially use the existing climate as a natural experiment in climate and agriculture.  
One study of this sort has found a relatively complex relationship between climate and 
agricultural value (as measure by land prices), with higher average temperatures in 
October and April clearing increasing farm value, higher temperatures in July and 
January reducing farm value, and higher precipitation increasing farm value only if it 
comes in January and April (versus July or October).
97  Moreover, this study finds that 
even in the U.S., interannual climatic variation reduces farm values.   Climate change is 
predicted to have clearly beneficial effects for increases of 2.5 degrees centigrade – with 
the amount of cropland increasing a little but crop revenue increasing significantly 
(between 17 and 20 per cent, depending upon how much additional rainfall comes with 
increased temperature) – but somewhat more ambiguous effects for a 5 degree centigrade 
                                                                                                                                                 
Although a warmer climate must on average have higher humidity, the Canadian Center model predicts that 
rainfall patterns will shift north and west, dramatically increasing the drought frequency in the southeastern 
and southern plains U.S. states.  Although they do not acknowledge this until the conclusion to their paper, 
Reilly et. al. at 66, the Canadian Center GCM “produces relatively extreme high temperatures compared 
with other climate models whereas the Hadley Center model produces temperature increases closer to the 
middle of existing climate models, but it produces particularly high levels of precipitation increases for the 
U.S.”   
96 J. Reilly, et. al., 57 Climatic Change at 59. 
97 Robert Mendelsohn, William Nordhaus, and Daigee Shaw, The Impact of Climate Variation on U.S. 
Agriculture, in The Impact of Climate Change on the U.S. Economy 55, 63, 67 (2004 edition).  32 
increase – with cropland down somewhat, while crop revenue increases enormously 
(between 26 and 28 per cent). 
98
Another approach that has been used to estimate the impact of changing climate 
on U.S. agriculture is to examine how year-to-year fluctuations in temperature and 
precipitation have influenced agricultural profits.
99  Using state level climate change 
projections from the Hadley 2 COAGCM model, on such study finds that if climate 
warms by 2-3 degrees centigrade (with about 3 inches more rainfall on average), then 
aggregate U.S. agricultural profits will increase by a modest amount, with an increase of 
$1.3 billion in annual profits, implying (with a 5% discount rate) an increase in the 
present value of U.S. agricultural land rents of $26 billion.
100  Although not statistically 
significant, this analysis also suggests that there may be very large interstate differences 
in the effect of climate change on agricultural profits:  given the Hadley 2 state-specific 
predictions, California is expected to suffer a loss of nearly 15% in its annual agricultural 
profits, while all other states together are predicted to have in an increase in agricultural 
profits.
101
More generally, a large number of studies find benefits to U.S. agriculture from 
global warming.
102 And the U.S. is not alone: developed countries will benefit in a 
variety of ways from a warming climate: increases in wine quality and the number of 
varieties that can produced in certain regions of both the U.S. and Europe;
103 an increase 
in the productivity of northern European agriculture and forestry.
104 The evidence shows 
                                                 
98 Mendelsohn, Nordhaus, and Shaw, The Impact of Climate Change on U.S. Agriculture, supra note __ at 
70-71. 
99See Olivier Deschênes and Michael Greenstone, The Economic Impacts of Climate Change: Evidence 
From Agricultural Profits and Random Fluctuations in Weather (MIT Department of Economics, Working 
Paper No. 04-26, August 2006), who adopt this approach after finding that traditional hedonic regressions 
of farm value on climate variables are not especially robust to sample selection and to explanatory variable 
inclusion.  
100 Deschênes and Greenstone, the Economic Impacts of Climate Change, supra note __ at 25. 
101 Deschênes and Greenstone, The Economic Impacts of Climate Change, supra note __ at 23. 
102 See Stanley A. Chagnon et. al., Problems in Estimating Impacts of Future Climate Change on 
Midwestern Corn Yields, 58 Clim. Change 109 (2003); Gregory J. Charbone, et. al., Response of Soybean 
and Sorghum to Varying Spatial Scales of Climate Change Scenarios in the Southeastern United States, 60 
Clim. Change 73 (2003); see generally on the effect of global warming in increasing American agricultural 
productivity, Policy Implications of Greenhouse Warming 556-566 (National Academy of Sciences 1992). 
103 Gregory V. Jones et. al., Climate Change and Global Wine Quality, 73 Clim. Change 319 (2005). 
104 Gianpiero Maracchi et. al., Impacts of Present and Future Climate Variability on Agriculture and 
Forestry in Temperate Regions: Europe, 70 Clim. Change 117 (2005). 33 
that wealthy developed countries such as the U.S. almost surely have agricultural benefits 
from a warmer global climate.
105
 
5. Global warming may increase the frequency of beneficial El Nino events  
 
Should global warming increase the frequency of El Nino events, then there will 
be a reduction the frequency and severity of U.S. losses from hurricanes.
106  In general, 
El Nino events generate positive net benefits for the U.S. as a whole.  However, climate 
change models are unlikely to ever have the capability of predicting the impact of global 
warming on El Nino event frequency and severity.  As neither of these points seems very 
well understood – neither the beneficial effects of El Nino events in the U.S. nor their 
inherent unpredictability -- it is worth spending a bit of time to explain why.   
The current set of GCM climate models are not very good at all in predicting the 
impact of global warming on El Nino frequency and intensity and its global impact.
107 
While several GCM models do indeed predict warming sea surface temperatures (SST’s) 
in the equatorial eastern Pacific, this is not El Nino warming but a relatively simple and 
direct consequence of higher C02, and according to climate scientists, it is “still an open 
question” as to whether such increases in average SST’s due to C02 buildup will cause 
changes in ENSO amplitude, whether the changes in averages are statistically 
independent of ENSO, or whether they are just a “nonlinear residual.”
108  As for ENSO 
frequency, GCM models are all over the map: in a run of 21 such models, 8 predicted 
much shorter ENSO cycles than observed, 5 much longer cycles, with only 8 of 21 doing 
a “relatively good” job at predicting ENSO oscillations.
109 Most seriously and quite 
intuitively, among the biases in GCM’s (which are “often as big as the signal one is 
                                                 
105 See Robert Mendelsohn, et. al., The Distributional Impact of Climate Change on Rich and Poor 
Countries, 11 Env. & Develop. Econ. 159 (2006). 
106 See the discussion and sources below, infra at notes __ to __. 
107 McPhaden et. al. At 1744.  As McPhaden et. al., Id., explain, while the “consensus outlook from the 
current generation of global climate models suggests no significant change in ENSO characteristics under 
various greenhouse gas emission scenarios that predicrt a doubling of atmospheric C02 from preindustrial 
levels over the next 100 years,” because “climate models have known flaws that compromise the reliability 
of future projections in the tropical Pacific,” “we cannot say with confidence at present how global 
warming will affect either ENSO variability or the background state on which it is superimposed.”   
108 Sang-Wook Yeh and Ben P. Kirtman, ENSO Amplitude Changes due to Climate Change Projections in 
Different Coupled Models, 20 J. Climate 203, 207 (2007) who hypothesize that disagreement among the 
climate models in predicting ENSO amplitude is caused by varying degrees of non-linearity in the models.    
109 Jia-Lin Lin, Interdecadal Variability of ENSO in 21 IPCC AR4 Coupled GCM’s, 34 Geo. Res. Letters 
L12702 (2007). 34 
trying to predict”
110) include a tendency to systematically underestimate tropical Pacific 
SST’s and hence to over-predict weakened easterly winds and– as such wind anomalies 
are precisely the condition that sets immediately precedes El Nino events – to over-
predict the frequency of El Nino events.
111
Still, suppose that the climate models that predict an increase in El Nino 
frequency due to global warming actually turn out to be correct: would this be a bad thing 
for the U.S?  The answer is almost surely no.  To see why this is so, it is important to 
briefly describe El Nino and the ENSO cycle of which it is a part.  ENSO, the El Nino –
Southern Oscillation, is a cycle between unusually warm (El Nino) and unusually cold 
sea surface temperatures in the tropical Pacific.
112 Under normal conditions, the easterly 
trade winds in the tropical Pacific cause the accumulation of warm surface water in the 
western Pacific and a corresponding upwelling of cold water in the equatorial eastern 
Pacific and coastal South America, and the sea surface west-east temperature gradient 
positively reinforces the east-west air pressure difference that drives the trade winds.
113  
An El Nino event occurs when the easterly trades weaken (as atmospheric pressure rises 
in the western tropical Pacific and falls in the eastern Pacific) leading to warmer waters 
and less upwelling in the central and eastern Pacific, a change in sea surface temperatures 
that itself then feeds back on the air pressure gradient, as further weakening of the trade 
winds that enhances the eastern and central Pacific sea surface warming even further, and 
the El Nino is on.   
Because surface sea temperatures in the tropical Pacific are directly related to 
changes in the Southern Oscillation, a major atmospheric pressure pattern, ENSO “is 
unique among climate phenomena in its strength, predictability, and global influence, 
projecting beyond the tropic Pacific through atmospheric teleconnections that affect 
patterns of weather variability worldwide.”
114 A strong El Nino, for example, brings 
                                                 
110 Hilary Spencer, Rowan Sutton, and Julia M. Slingo, El Nino in a Coupled Climate Model: Sensitivity to 
Changes in Mean State Induced by Heat Flux and Wind Stress Corrections, 20 J. Climate 2273 (2007). 
111 See Spencer et. al., supra note __ at 2295. 
112 Michael J. McPhaden, Stephen E. Zebiak, Michael H. Glantz, ENSO as an Integrating Concept in Earth 
Science, 314 Science 1740 (2006). 
113 This and the remainder of my description of the ENSO phenomenon is drawn from McPhaden et. al., at 
1740. 
114 Michael J. McPhaden, Stephen E. Zebiak, Michael H. Glantz, ENSO as an Integrating Concept in Earth 
Science, 314 Science 1740 (2006). For detailed discussion of how tropical ENSO events influence weather 
at much higher latitudes (ENSO teleconnections), see Kevin E. Trenberth, et. al., Progress During TOGA in 35 
drought to Australia, Indonesia and other parts of the western Pacific while inundating 
islands in the central Pacific and the west coast of South America in torrential rain.
115 
Although the impacts of strong El Nino and La Nina events at higher latitudes and in 
oceans other than the Pacific are more attenuated and therefore less predictable, it is 
known that Atlantic hurricanes “tend to be reduced in number and intensity during 
moderate to strong El Nino events but stronger and more numerous during La Nina 
events,” and that “these year-to-year changes translate into a 3-to-1 greater likelihood of a 
major hurricane striking the United States during La Nina versus El Nino years, with 
correspondingly higher losses during La Nina years.”
116
  El Nino events are currently (and may be inherently) unpredictable in advance of 
the weakening of trade winds that bring them on.
117  However unpredictable in advance 
                                                                                                                                                 
Understanding Modeling Global Teleconnections Associated with Tropical Sea Surface Temperatures, 103 
J. Geo. Res. 14,291 (1998).  Interestingly, it has recently been found that the global impact of both warm 
(El Nino) and cold (La Nina) phases of ENSO is strongly dependent upon the level of solar activity, with 
ENSO having a noticeable impact on the whole lower stratosphere and upper tropical troposphere – 
effecting both the subtropical jet stream and the polar vortex – only during solar minima.  See Vladimir N. 
Kryjov and Chung-Kyu Park, Solar Modulation of the El-Nino/Southern Oscillation Impact on the 
Northern Hemisphere Annular Mode, 34 Geo. Res. Letters L10701 (2007).  
115 McPhaden, et. al. at 1741.  As McPhaden et. al. note, weaker events such as the El Nino of 2004-2005 
“may have impacts that are muted or even undetectable above the background weather noise of the 
atmosphere.”   
116 McPhaden, et. al., at 1741. As explained by Roger A. Pielke Jr. and Christopher N. Landsea, La Nina, El 
Nino, and Atlantic Hurricane Damages in the United States, 80 Bull. Amer. Meteoro. Soc. 2027, 2028 
(1999), the larger vertical shear that accompanies an El Nino has its greatest effect on storm patterns in the 
area between 10 degrees and 20 degrees North from North Africa to Central America.  Hence the larger 
vertical shear associated with El Ninos tends to reduce the number of Atlantic tropical storms.  Id. at 2028.  
When Pielke and Landsea, Id. at 2029-2031 looked at normalized hurricane damages over the period 1925-
1997 (damages indexed to take account of inflation, wealth and population), they found a large difference 
in the probability of hurricanes generating more than $1 billion in damages between El Nino versus La 
Nina or neutral years, with a .77 probability in La Nina  years and .48 probability in neutral years versus 
only a .32 probability in El Nino years.  It is true that Pielke and Landsea found that the frequency of very 
damaging hurricanes, with losses exceeding $5 billion, did not vary as much between La Nina and El Nino 
years, but there were relatively few such storms even over their long sample period; for this reason they 
found no statistically significant difference in the probability of such very large storms in La Nina versus El 
Nino years.  Id. at 2031.  
117 There are actually now two different theories of the Southern Oscillation of which El Nino is a 
component: the first holds that it is a “weakly dampled oscillator that needs to be triggered by a random 
disturbance. Westerly wind bursts in the western equatorial Pacific appear necessary [on this theory] at the 
onset of El Nino…; the second theory views the “Southern Oscillation as a lower frequency self-sustaining 
mode of oscillation in the tropical Pacific.” David J. Stephens et. al., Differences in Atmospheric 
Circulation between the Development of Weak and Strong Warm Events in the Southern Oscillation, 20 J. 
Climate 2191, 2192 (2007).    On the latter theory, the quasi-periodicity of the ENSO cycle is understood as 
an aspect of a natural oscillator in the tropical Pacific coupled ocean-atmosphere system, Nicholas E. 
Graham and Warren B. White, The El Nino Cycle: A Natural Oscillator of the Pacific Ocean-Atmosphere 
System, 240 Science 1293, 1293-1297 (1988). See Eli Tziperman, Lewi Stone, Mark A. Crane and Hans 
Jarosh, El Nino Chaos: Overlapping of Resonances Between the Seasonal Cycle and the Pacific Ocean-36 
they may be, as one leading meteorologist has recently commented, “all weather 
conditions produce winners and losers, and in general, less is known about the winners 
than about the losers.”
118  This is perhaps especially true of ENSO, as “it is often the 
adverse impacts of ENSO variations that receive the most publicity, whereas the benefits, 
at least for some regions of the globe, are much less understood and appreciated.”
119 For 
example, although the strong 1997-1998 El Nino brought devastating drought and fire to 
areas of the western Pacific and Central America, it generated both costs and benefits for 
the U.S.  As predicted, the 97-98 El Nino brought coastal storms and heavy rains to 
California and an increased number of severe rainstorms (and accompanying tornadoes) 
to the Florida, Texas and other southern states.
120 By the end of May, 1998, 189 deaths 
nationally had been attributed to the El Nino conditions.
121
Yet the 1997-98 El Nino also generated clear benefits for the U.S.  The mild, 
virtually snow-free winter it caused in the northern U.S. was estimated to have reduced 
by 828 the number of deaths due to extreme low temperatures and to snow and ice 
storms, and to have saved almost $9 billion in reduced heating costs and losses due to 
spring snowmelt floods.  By eliminating major Atlantic hurricanes, the 97-98 El Nino not 
only eliminated the $5 billion in property damage that hurricanes had on average been 
causing in the U.S. during the 1990’s, but also saved an expected 20 lives that would 
have been lost in hurricanes.
122  On balance, the 97-98 El Nino was estimated to have 
                                                                                                                                                 
Atmosphere Oscillator, 264 Science 72 (1994). This oscillator is a low order, non-linear chaotic system, 
and hence somewhat predictable in the short term.  See Jose A. Rial, et. al., Nonlinearities, Feedbacks and 
Critical Thresholds within the Earth’s Climate System, 65 Climatic Change 11, 26 (2004).  This is not the 
only view, however, and not a view toward which recent evidence has been especially kind. As McPhaden 
et. al. explain,  supra note __ at 1742, optimism of the 1980’s regarding the possibility of developing 
models that would allow the prediction of ENSO up to a year in advance faded during the 1990’s, as 
existing models failed to “predict the onset, rapid growth, ultimate magnitude and sudden demise of the 
giant 1997-1998 El Nino” and failed also to reliably predict the “weak to moderate strength ENSO related 
fluctuations of the early to mid-1990’s.” Most recently, the El Nino of 2006-2007 was not recognized until 
large wind shifts were observed in the western Pacific in July of 2006.  Id.     
118 Stanley A. Changon, Impacts of 1997-98 El Nino Generated Weather in the United States, 80 Bull. 
Amer. Meteor. Soc. 1819, 1826 (1999). 
119 McPhaden, et. al. at 1743. 
120 Stanley A. Changnon, Impacts of 1997-98 El Nino-Generated Weather in the United States, 80 Bull. 
Amer. Meteor. Soc. 1819, 1821 (1999). 
121 Changon, 80 Bull. Amer. Meteor. Soc. 1819, 1821. 
122 Changon, 80 Bull. Amer. Meteor. Soc. 1819, 1822-1825. 37 




6. Summary: the benefits to the U.S. from global warming 
 
The long list of potential benefits to many regions of the U.S. from global 
warming just recounted is not meant to suggest that global warming will benefit all 
regions of the planet Earth.  My focus in this Article, to recall, is relatively narrow: to 
inquire whether it is reasonable to interpret the CAA – a statute designed to provide the 
benefit of reduced local air pollution harms to virtually every developed metropolitan 
region of the U.S. – to also mandate a reduction in U.S. ghg emissions because those 
emissions are believed to contribute to global warming?  The long list of short to medium 
term benefits to many regions of the U.S. from moderate global warming must, I believe, 
be a key part of the answer:  it is hard to imagine that the Congress which passed the 
CAA to reduce harm from air pollution would also have wanted to mandate costly 
reductions in gases whose short to medium term impact on the U.S. is not to cause harm, 
but to confer benefits. 
 
D. Availability, effectiveness and distribution of the costs of alternative approaches 
to reducing GHG emissions  
 
To decide that Congress would have wanted the EPA to regulate ghg’s under the 
CAA, a judge must also consider the feasibility and cost of such regulation.  Not only 
does the CAA require costs to be considered in the setting of automobile emission 
standards,
124 but as argued above, the structure of the CAA was fundamentally changed 
in both 1977 and 1990 largely as a result of Congressional learning about and concern 
with the regional distribution of the costs of air pollution reduction.   When it comes to 
the goal of reducing ghg emissions from automobiles, the basic structure of the CAA 
simply does not give the EPA the authority to pursue the range of policies needed to 
                                                 
123 Changon, 80 Bull. Amer. Meteor. Soc. 1819, 1826.  
124 Under Section 202(a)(3)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. §§7521(a)(3)(A)(i), emission standards for hydrocarbons, 
carbon monoxide, oxides of nitrogen, and particulate matter for engines made after 1983 “shall contain 
standards which reflect the greatest degree of emission reduction achievable through the application of 
technology which the Administrator determines will be available for the model year to which such 
standards apply, giving appropriate consideration to cost, energy, and safety factors associated with the 
application of such technology.”  38 
achieve the goal.  A more general program of reducing ghg emissions from power plants 
and other sources – as the Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA almost surely 
requires – likewise entails new and as yet unavailable technologies and a potentially 
massive national redistribution of costs and benefits of control.  The complex bargain 
among different regions and different industries that is the CAA in no way can be 
extended to include ghg emission control.   In particular, the likely concentration of the 
costs of reducing ghg emissions on the shoulders of poor, rural households is so unfair as 
to make it very unlikely that any Congress – either the Congress that wrote the CAA, or 
today’s – would vote in favor of such a program of emission reduction unless some kind 
of benefits – far beyond the mere reduction in U.S. ghg emissions -- were extended to the 
people and states who would be bearing most of the costs of ghg emission reduction.  
 
1. Reducing automobile GHG emissions:  policy responses are costly and Congress has 
pursued them in separate legislation, not in the CAA  
 
In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court did not of course resolve the question of 
which particular policy instruments should be chosen by the EPA as a way of reducing 
ghg emissions from cars.  When it comes to greenhouse gas emissions from autos, EPA’s 
primary statutory policy instrument for reducing conventional air pollutants in 
automobile emissions – emission standards based on technologies such as catalytic 
converters
125 – is completely ineffective.  This is true for the simple but fundamental 
reason that the most significant human-produced ghg, carbon dioxide, is an inherent 
byproduct of combustion of carbon-based fuels.   
The only ways to reduce the amount of C02 in auto emissions are to reduce the 
amount of fuel used by autos – to mandate improvements in fuel efficiency – or to 
mandate a change in the composition of the fuel by requiring the use of fuels with lower 
carbon content and/or lower net carbon emissions through their full life cycle (production 
to combustion in cars).  Although Congress has in fact recently increased auto fuel 
economy standards,
126 such fuel economy standards are not set by EPA but rather by the 
                                                 
125 See Richard O. Faulk and John S. Gray, Stormy Weather Ahead? The Legal Environment of Global 
Climate Change 61 (Draft, 2007). 
126 See my discussion infra at notes __ to __ of the new CAFE standards found in the Energy Security and 
Independence Act of 2007. 39 
Department of Energy.
127 Congress has also mandated the use and subsidized the 
production of ethanol as an alternative fuel that may have the potential to be a cleaner 
fuel – in terms of total C02 emissions – than gasoline.
128 Once again, however, Congress 
has mandated biofuel use in separate, energy legislation that has nothing to do with the 
EPA.
129 Another alternative path to reducing the amount of gasoline burned and C02 
emitted is to subsidize consumer purchases of high mileage and hybrid gas-electric 
vehicles.  In the Energy Policy Act of 2005
130, Congress provided such subsidies to 
purchasers of hybrids – in the form of a tax credit worth up to $3400 during early 
2006.
131 The effectiveness of these policies depends in large part upon consumer 
behavior in choosing what car to drive and how much to drive it.
132  Still, Congress has 
implemented tax incentives for hybrids not in the CAA, but in energy legislation. 
There are still other policy options: from an environmental point of view, for 
example, it would be far better if instead of mandating the use of biofuels, Congress used 
                                                 
127 Acting under the authority of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§32901-32919 
(2007) and now also the Energy Security and Independence Act of 2007. 
128 On the renewable fuel subsidy program created by the Energy Policy Act of 2005, see Faulk and Gray, 
Stormy Weather Ahead?, supra note __ at 64.  As I discuss below, infra text at notes __ to __, the ethanol 
requirement has been massively increased by the Energy Independence and   
Security Act of 2007,  The corn-based ethanol currently being subsidized and used in the U.S. to the tune of 
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funding research into cellulosic ethanol, which has the potential to be a carbon negative fuel.   See 
Katharine Sanderson, A Field in Ferment, 444 Nature 673 (2006).  Recent work strongly suggests that this 
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to the conversion of forests and grasslands to biofuel crop production,  moving to ethanol as a fuel involves 
massive net increases in carbon dioxide: as much as 50% if the fuel is switchgrass, see Timothy 
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the Biofuel Carbon Debt, Science Express, Feb. 7, 2008, 10.1126 Science.1152747. 
129 In the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Public Law 109-58, 119 Stat. 609 (August 8, 2005), Congress tripled 
the ethanol requirement in automobile fuel, and in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. 
L. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492 (December 19, 2007), Congress increased the ethanol requirement even further, 
quadrupling ethanol requirements over the 2009-2022 period. 
130 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Public Law 109-58, 119 Stat. 609 (August 8, 2005). 
131 See the discussion in James M. Sallee, The Incidence of Tax Credits for Hybrid Vehicles (University of 
Michigan, Nov. 2007), who finds that consumers received almost the entire benefit from the subsidy (that 
is, prices for Prius’s and other hybrids did not increase due to the tax credit).   Thirteen states have 
legislated tax incentives for hybrids. Union of Concerned Scientists, State and Federal Hybrid Incentives, 
September, 2007, http://go.ucsusa.org/hybridcenter/incentives.cfm. 
132 See, for example, Brent D. Yacobucci and Robert Bamberger, Automobile and Light Truck Fuel 
Economy: The CAFE Standards (CRS Report to Congress, Updated January, 2007), and B.B. Gleisner and 
S.A.Weaver, Cars, Carbon and Kyoto: Evaluating an Emissions Charge and other Policy Instruments as 
Incentives for a Transition to Hybrid Cars in New Zealand, 1 Kotutiui: New Zealand Journal of Social 
Sciences Online 81 (2006). 40 
the revenue from a gasoline tax to conserve and even expand the range of existing forests 
and savannahs.
133  All of these different policy instruments for reducing automobile ghg 
emissions carry costs. Increasing CAFE standards, for example, has a substantial welfare 
cost, because improvements in fuel efficiency lead to an increased number of miles 
driven by motorists.  This increase in miles driven has large external costs – from 
increased congestion, accidents and local pollution – that have recently been estimated at 
$2.53 cents per gallon, or over eight times the combined carbon and oil dependency 
externalities from driving.
134 Reducing ghg tailpipe emissions by increasing automobile 
efficiency may generate savings to automobile drivers by reducing fuel bills.  But such 
fuel efficiencies are expensive to achieve and so will entail significantly higher prices for 
cars.  Poor consumers may be unable to afford such new, pricey vehicles, and so may 
face the prospect of being priced out of the market for automobiles.
135  I n  A m e r i c a  
(unlike much of Europe), the consequences of being priced out of the automobile market 
are often grim: a poor American who is unable to afford a car faces a severe restriction in 
educational and employment opportunities.  
The cost of reducing automobile ghg emissions, moreover, is likely to vary across 
different American states and regions.  For example, increases in gasoline taxes are 
generally regressive, hurting the poor more than the rich (because gasoline expenditures 
generally account for a lower share of a person’s income, the higher is their income).  
Higher gasoline taxes also generally cost people who live in rural areas more than they 
cost people who live in urban areas (because people in rural areas drive more).
136
With these large, potentially regressive and unequally geographically distributed 
costs of alternative policies for reducing automobile emissions, it is hardly surprising that 
Congress has dealt warily and cautiously in implementing these policies.  Most 
                                                 
133 For such a proposal, see Renton Righelato and Dominick V. Spracklen, Carbon Mitigation by Biofuels 
or by Saving and Restoring Forests?, 317 Science 902 (2007). 
134 Ian W.H. Parry, Carolyn Fisher, and Winston Harrington, Should Corporate Average Fuel Economy 
(CAFE) Standards be Tightened? 5 (Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper 04-53, December, 2004). 
135 See Congressional Budget Office, Tradeoffs in Allocating Allowances for C02 Emissions 3 (April, 
2007), cited and discussed in Michael P. Vandenbergh and Brooke Ackerly, Climate Change: The Equity 
Problem, Vanderbilt University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 07-23, April 2007, p. 6 
(forthcoming 26 Va. Envtl. L. J. __ (2007)).   
136 Reducing Gasoline Consumption: Three Policy Options, Chapter 6 (CBO, 2002), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdoc.cfm?index=399.  Somewhat surprisingly, there apparently is no formal work on 
the distributional impact of CAFE standards.   41 
importantly, virtually all of the policy instruments for directly or indirectly reducing 
automobile emissions – from biofuels requirements to CAFE standards – are not found in 
the CAA, but in other statutes, and EPA is not the agency implementing them.  Indeed, of 
all the potential policy instruments for reducing ghg emissions in automobile exhausts, 
the only one that the EPA has authority to adopt under the CAA is to require a change in 
the composition of automobile fuel.
137  One must ask whether a Congress that intended 
for EPA to regulate ghg emissions from autos would have so severely limited the 
regulatory tools available to the agency to accomplish this goal.    
 
2.  Cost distribution issues in reducing GHG emissions from non-auto sources 
 
As other legal scholars have clearly explained,
138 the Court’s broad reading of 
“pollutant” under the CAA will have the effect of compelling EPA to regulate not only 
automobile tailpipe ghg emissions, but also ghg emissions from stationary sources -- 
directly for new stationary sources (which must comply with federal new source emission 
standards) and indirectly, through NAAQS, for existing stationary sources.   Issues 
regarding the magnitude and distribution of cost of reducing ghg emissions from 
automobile tailpipe emissions are just as severe when it comes to policies to reduce ghg 
emissions from stationary sources.   
As for the distribution of emission reduction cost across income levels, studies 
indicate that the distribution of the cost of reducing ghg emissions from stationary 
sources may be just as regressive as is the cost of reducing automobile tailpipe ghg 
                                                 
137 Under Section 211 of the Clean Air Act , 42 U.S.C. §§1857f-6c, as amended by section 9, Pub.  
L. 91-604, EPA has the authority to regulate automobile fuel and fuel additives.  Under draft legislation 
introduced in the U.S. House in June, 2007, the EPA would be given the express authority to regulate the 
carbon content of automobile fuels.  See Discussion Draft of Alternative Fuels Legislation, June 1, 2007, 
available at http://www.energycommerce.house.gov/energy_110/index.shtml. 
138 See Jonathan H. Adler, Massachusetts v. EPA Heats Up Climate Policy No Less than Administrative 
Law: A Comment 7, 9, Case Western University School of Law, Research Paper No. 07-20, June 2007 
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Performance Standards for power plants has been upended by the Court’s decision.”) 42 
emissions.  The only currently available method of reducing C02 emissions from coal 
burning power plants increases a typical customer’s utility bills by 44%.
139 Given that the 
poor are well known to spend disproportionately more on energy than do wealthier 
households,
140 unless offsetting measures are taken, the cost of reducing ghg emissions 
from power plants will clearly fall disproportionately on the poor.
141 And not just the 
poor, but especially poor minorities may disproportionately bear the burden of reducing 
ghg emissions.  In opposing the Kyoto Protocol, a study commissioned by minority 
organizations such as the National Black Chamber of Commerce and Latin American 
Management Association found that Kyoto could cause “1.4 million blacks and Hispanics 
to become unemployed, cause four million blacks and Hispanics to become 
impoverished, and reduce by 10 percent the incomes of some twenty-five million black 
and Hispanic workers.”
142
                                                 
139 Eli Kintisch, Making Dirty Coal Plants Cleaner, 317 Science 184, 186 (2007).  This method  involves 
passing treated flue gas through an absorber with the solvent monoethanolamine (MEA); the solvent bonds 
with C02 molecules, the C02/MEA complexes are then separated out, and, finally, the C02 is purified for 
ground storage.  Id. at 185.  A model Energy Department – sponsored plant called Future Gen that uses a 
newer and more advanced technique, integrated coal gasification, has greatly increased in cost (from $1 to 
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Feb. 3, 2008.   
140  See, for example, James P. Stucker, The Impact of Energy Price Increases on Households: An 
Illustration, Rand Inst. Report No. P-5585 (1976)(finding that “Direct energy expenditures are regressive in 
their structure; lower income households spend a greater portion of their budget on these items than 
wealthier households,…and [a]ll energy taxes are probably regressive; utility gas taxes are the most 
regressive, and taxes on refined petroleum products such as gasoline are the least.”) More recently, Ian 
W.H. Parry, Are Emission Permits Regressive?, RFF Discussion Paper No. 03-21, p. 32 (2003) estimates 
that the poorest fifth of households spend almost 10% of their income on electricity, while the richest fifth 
spend less than 6% of their income on electricity.  More dramatically, Jayata Battacharya et. al., Heat or 
Eat? Cold Weather Shocks and Nutrition in Poor American Families, 93 Am. J. Pub. Health 1149 (2003) 
find that while poor families increased their fuel expenditure and decreased their food expenditure during 
unusually cold months, richer families increased fuel expenditures but did not decrease their food 
expenditures during such periods. 
141 A variety of ways to offset the impact on the poor of energy cost increases caused by ghg emission 
reduction measures are surveyed by Robert Greenstein, et. al., Designing Climate-Change Legislation that 
Shields Low-Income Households from Increased Poverty and Hardship, Center on Budget and Policy 
Priorities, Revised Nov. 8, 2007.  Distributional considerations can dramatically alter the choice among 
closely related policy instruments.  For example, Parry, Are Emission Permits Regressive?, supra note __, 
finds that grandfathered C02 permits can be highly regressive, making the top fifth of income earners better 
off but the bottom fifth much worse off, while in an earlier study, Terry M. Dinan and Diane Lim Rogers, 
Distributional Effects of Carbon Allowance Trading: How Government Decisions Determine Winners and 
Losers, 55 National Tax J. 199 (2002) estimated that if C02 permits were instead auctioned off to utilities 
and then revenues returned in lump-sum rebates to all households, low income households would be 
moderately better off while high income households would be worse off by approximately $1700.  
142 See Faulk and Gray, Stormy Weather Ahead?, supra  note __ at 49. 43 
The cost of ghg emission reduction is not only likely to be unequally distributed 
across rich and poor.  Because of stark regional differences in the predominant fuel 
source for electric power generation, there are likely to be stark regional differences in 
the cost of reducing ghg emissions from power plants.  For regions of the country – 
perhaps most notably, the Pacific Northwest, and parts of New England -- that get their 
electric power primarily from hydro, natural gas or nuclear sources, ghg emissions are 
already very low and the cost of complying with emission reduction requirements will 
likely be low.
143 It is in regions of the country that rely more upon coal, as source of 
electric power where the cost of ghg emission controls will be most severe. Large 
interstate variations in the likely cost of complying with a federal regulation requiring 
power plants to reduce their ghg emissions are reflected in Figure 1.  That figure shows 
how state per capita C02 emissions range from lows of 11 in many Pacific coast and New 
England and Northeastern states to 63 in West Virginia, 80 in North Dakota, and 125 in 
Wyoming. That state per capita C02 emissions are driven in large part by the 
predominant electric power fuel in a state is clearly revealed by a recent study the 
Environmental Integrity Institute.  That study shows that power plants contributing the 
most carbon dioxide emissions are primarily (almost exclusively) coal-burning and are 
concentrated in twelve states: Texas, Pennsylvania, Indiana, Alabama, Georgia, North 
Carolina, Ohio, West Virginia, Wyoming, Florida, Kentucky, and New Mexico (ranked 
by total emissions).
144 Even within coal-burning states, there are variations in ghg 
emissions that reflect primarily the age and efficiency of the power plants and also the 
type of coal burned.
145
 
[Figure 1 About Here] 
 
Fuel source is not the only determinant of state C02 emissions.  That states such 
as North Dakota and Wyoming have such high per capita C02 emission levels is not only 
due to their reliance upon coal as the source of energy to generate electric power, but also 
                                                 
143 Here I am assuming absolute caps on ghg emissions or emission rates.  Were EPA to instead require 
equal percentage reductions, then it is possible that – aside from zero emitters -- the lowest emitting plant 
types would have the highest marginal costs of compliance. 
144 See Environmental Integrity Project, Dirty Kilowatts: America’s Most Polluting Power Plants 4-7 (July, 
2007). 
145 Environmental Integrity Project, Dirty Kilowatts at 4-7. 44 
their location.  Studies show, for example, that large, cold countries – places where 
people have to heat their homes and offices for many months of the year, and where even 




E.  Implication: the regional and socioeconomic distribution of costs and benefits 
from reducing GHG emissions is so radically different than the pattern of costs and 
benefits from reducing conventional air pollutants that the CAA cannot reasonably 
be interpreted to mandate GHG emission reduction 
 
By detailing how global warming is likely to actually benefit many regions of the 
U.S. in the short to medium term while ghg emission reduction will likely entail 
significant costs to many regions and many poor people in the U.S., my discussion thus 
far may well have made the reader wonder why Massachusetts or any other state would 
have been among the plaintiffs in a suit like Massachusetts v. EPA.  There were in fact 
twelve state plaintiffs in that case: California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, 
and Washington.  My discussion thus far has already revealed a major thing that all of 
these states have in common and a major reason that they sued the EPA to compel ghg 
emission regulation:  with the exception of New Mexico, all of these states already have 
relatively low per capita C02 emissions and therefore stand to gain an economic 
comparative advantage relative to other, higher emitting states from federal regulation of 
ghg’s.   Given the relatively low costs and potential economic gain to the plaintiff states 
from federal ghg regulation, the attorney generals who actually represented the plaintiff 
states clearly felt no great need to find additional tangible benefits to justify a lawsuit that 
for them personally probably held the potential for very real political benefits.
147 To 
satisfy standing requirements, however, Massachusetts alleged, of course, that it would 
benefit from federal regulation of ghg’s today because it would suffer harm from possible 
21
st century sea level rise due to global warming.  The Massachusetts v. EPA majority 
                                                 
146 See Eric Neumayer, National Carbon Dioxide Emissions: Geography Matters, 36 Area 33 (2004). 
147 As Barry Rabe, From Statehouse to Greenhouse (2002) has persuasively argued, the fact that so many 
states and localities led U.S. efforts to pass ghg legislation is in large part to be explained by the desire of 
state and local politicians (what he calls “policy entrepreneurs”) to advance their own careers by acquiring 
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was persuaded by Massachusetts’ affidavit evidence, declaring that  “rising sea levels 
[have] already begun to swallow Massachusetts coastal land,” and “if sea levels continue 
to rise as predicted, one Massachusetts official believes that a significant fraction of 
coastal property will ‘either be permanently lost through inundation or temporarily lost 
through periodic storm surge and flooding.” The other plaintiff states could have also 
pointed to evidence of similar potential harms to them and/or their citizens from global 
warming.  For example, some climate models predict that New Mexico (and other 
southwestern states) will become more drought prone due to global warming;
148as 
already discussed, the ski industry in states such as Vermont is generally projected to lose 
from global warming.    
  Thus the plaintiff states in Massachusetts v. EPA were a group that – at least from 
the point of view of their Attorney Generals – were likely to be net beneficiaries from 
regulating ghg’s under the CAA.  But in asking whether it would be reasonable or even 
sensible to interpret the CAA broadly to regulate ghg’s, the question to ask is not whether 
the plaintiffs might possibly benefit from such an interpretation, but whether such an 
interpretation can possibly be seen as consistent with the overall purposes and structure 
of the CAA.   It cannot be.  What is most strikingly clear, from both the textual structure 
                                                 
148 Since as explained above the GCM models are indeed unable to predict how global warming is likely to 
effect the frequency and severity of ENSO, and since ENSO is a major determinant of large scale weather 
patterns in regions such as the southwestern U.S., it might seem that climate models would also be unable 
to tell us much about whether or not global warming will lead to drought in the southwestern U.S.  Recent 
and highly publicized predictions that the U.S. southwest will instead become more drought-prone due to 
global warming are in fact predicted not as a consequence of La Nina events becoming more frequent or 
severe due to global warming. Instead, these drought predictions are derived from computer predictions of 
changes in global atmospheric circulation patterns caused by warmer surface temperatures.  Notably, 
climate scientist Richard Seager and his colleagues have found support for the hypothesis of a more 
drought prone southwestern U.S. in a GCM model prediction that global warming will move the Hadley 
cell circulation and mid-latitude westerlies poleward, thus robbing the southwestern U.S. of ocean moisture 
and subjecting it to very stable drying descending air.  Richard Seager, et. al., Model Projections of an 
Imminent Transition to a More Arid Climate in Southwestern North America, 316 Science 1181, 1183 
(2007).  Ironically, such drying is caused by the fact that a warmer atmosphere will also be a more humid 
one.  Basically, the warmer the global mean temperature, the higher the latitude necessary to get cool 
enough temperatures for water to precipitate out as rain. Seager et. al. conclude that “while the most severe 
future droughts will still occur during persistent La Nina events, …they will be worse than any since the 
Medieval period, because the La Nina conditions will be perturbing a base state that is drier than any 
experienced recently.” Id. at 1184.   Of course, emphasizing the impact of possible poleward-shifting 
westerlies while ignoring the drought-destroying impact of possibly more frequent and/or severe El Nino 
events would seem at the very least to be to give a very incomplete and somewhat slanted picture of what a 
warmer climate may mean for the southwestern U.S.  For more on this and other troubling rhetorical 
strategies that have come to characterize the climate change science/policy world, see Jason Johnston,  The 
IPCC as Expert Witness:  Questioning the Rhetorical Strategy of Climate Change Scientist-Advocates.   46 
and legislative history, is that the CAA represented a series of complex compromises 
among different regions and interests within the U.S.   
  Consider first stationary source air pollution.  Here, the basic structure of the CAA 
anticipated that places with the dirtiest air would incur the biggest costs, but probably 
also get the biggest health benefits, from reducing air pollution.  Through its scheme of 
cooperative federalism, the CAA gave states significant discretion in determining how to 
achieve those benefits at acceptable cost.   As originally written, the law would have 
allowed places with air quality that met federal standards – places with few present 
benefits from controlling pollution -- to pollute their airsheds as much as they wanted 
until air quality had deteriorated to federal minimal levels.  In concrete regional terms, 
the CAA imposed most of the cost of reducing air pollution on the developed Midwestern 
and Northeastern (including mid-Atlantic) regions, but those regions also got most of the 
benefit.  Regions that did not have bad air pollution problems as of the early 1970’s – 
such as the Southwest, Mountain West and much of the Southeast – were not required to 
make their good air quality even better, but rather were allowed to continue to pollute at 
relatively high levels and so worsen over time their ambient air quality. 
  As the evidence recounted above shows, global warming is expected to generate a 
pattern of short to near term costs and benefits that will differ dramatically across 
different U.S. states and regions.  So too will the cost of reducing stationary source ghg 
emissions vary greatly across different states and regions.  Putting the data on global 
warming benefits and costs together with the data on ghg emission reduction costs in 
concrete regional terms, it is quite clear that the northern third of the U.S., and most large 
and relatively cold states, are likely to both benefit from global warming and also to have 
quite high costs of reducing stationary source ghg emissions.  The southern states may 
well suffer from global warming but also generally have very high costs of reducing 
stationary source emissions.  The Pacific Coast, Northeastern and New England regions 
are looking at a very uncertain mix of costs and benefits from global warming, but are 
likely to have relatively low costs of reducing ghg emissions.   
  The pollutants regulated under the CAA presented a relatively clear pattern: 
developed parts of the country with high pollution incurred relatively big costs but also 
got big benefits from reducing air pollution.  Regulation of ghg emissions presents a 47 
more complicated but still obviously different pattern: many, perhaps most of the U.S. 
regions that have the least to lose from global warming would have the highest cost of 
reducing ghg emissions; the regions that would gain the most – such as the wealthy 
northeast – also have relatively low costs of reducing ghg emissions.  In deciding whether 
to vote for the CAA’s regulation of conventional pollutants, federal legislators from a 
very large number of then relatively less developed states and districts voted for 
something that cost their constituents relatively little while bringing them some benefits.  
Had they been voting on a CAA that regulated ghg emissions, federal legislators from 
many of those same states would have to decide whether to vote for a law that cost their 
constituents an enormous amount while not only not bringing them big benefits, but 
probably costing them the benefits of a warmer and milder climate.  If anything, one 
would expect that the latter vote could only be obtained through a complex compromise 
that gave such states and districts something in exchange for their otherwise altruistic 
support for curbing ghg emissions.  But such speculation is unnecessary to my argument.  
Because of the dissimilarity in the interstate and interregional pattern of costs and 
benefits from ghg emission regulation, there simply is no basis for concluding that a vote 
for the CAA was a vote for the CAA to regulate ghg emissions.  
  This applies equally to the precise question of automobile tailpipe ghg emissions 
that was squarely at issue in Massachusetts v. EPA.  The automobile (or mobile) source 
emission standards found in the CAA represent a complex compromise between the 
interests of a large number of legislators from states and metropolitan districts with 
serious auto-induced smog problems but no particular economic interest in the 
automobile industry (non-auto urban states and districts) and a smaller, but nonetheless 
influential group of legislators from states and districts that were heavily reliant upon the 
auto industry for jobs and local taxes (auto states and districts).   The CAA gave both 
sides something: federal emission standards for the urban non-auto legislators, but, at the 
insistence of the auto legislators, a severe limitation on the legal power of the non-auto 
urban states and localities to set auto emission standards that were tougher than the 
federal standards (only California being given that ability).   Now whether or not a 
federal legislator from an urban, non-auto state or district would support federal ghg auto 
emission standards would depend upon the correspondence between the interests of such 48 
a 1970 vintage federal legislator in curbing the smog problem and her interest in cutting 
ghg emissions to potentially someday reduce the rate of increase in global average 
temperature.   Given the very well demonstrated acute and chronic health effects of smog 
in urban airsheds versus the quite widely varying impact of higher average temperatures 
on urban quality of life, it would not seem farfetched to suppose that many non-auto 
federal legislators would have found it in their constituents interests to pay more for cars 
so as to reduce smog, but not to pay still more just to reduce ghg emissions.   
  Or perhaps not.  My point is precisely that because of the vast difference between 
the problems potentially caused by the air pollutants regulated by the CAA versus those 
potentially caused by ghg emissions, a vintage 1970 federal legislator’s vote on the CAA 
tells us virtually nothing about how she would vote on the question of whether the CAA 
should include ghg emissions. To interpret the CAA as saying anything about the 
regulation of ghg emissions is fundamentally for the Court to force a vote upon the 
federal legislators of the year 1970 that they never took or even contemplated.  Even 
more, as I shall argue in the next section, by such an interpretation, the Supreme Court of 
2007 not only took a vote that was never taken by the Congress of 1970, but may well 
have significantly impeded a vote on ghg emssion regulation by the Congress of today. 
 
F. GHG emission reduction entails short term costs for uncertain, long-term 
benefits, and a bargain that was not contemplated by Congress in drafting the CAA, 
and which a rational legislator would surely reject 
 
It might be argued that even if global warming is likely to bring short term 
benefits to many parts of the U.S., and even if the costs of reducing ghg emissions are 
very unfairly distributed, falling mainly on poor and rural households, because of global 
warming’s potentially catastrophic long-term consequences, Congress would still have 
wanted EPA to regulate ghg’s under the CAA.  This argument may be easily defeated: 
there is nothing in the text or legislative history of the CAA to suggest that Congress 
contemplated that greenhouse gas emissions and the global warming problem would be 
covered by the CAA.   Indeed, there is nothing in the text or legislative history of the 
CAA to suggest that Congress was in the least bit concerned with a possibly beneficial air 
“pollutant” whose harmful effects – if they occurred at all -- would be felt not by the 49 
current generation, or the generation after that, or the next, which would indeed not be 
felt for over a century and perhaps longer. 
Such neglect of possible, albeit highly uncertain future benefits from ghg 
emission reduction might be ascribed simply to legislative myopia: to the socially 
undesirable tendency of legislators to care only about conferring short term benefits and 
avoiding (or concealing) short term costs so as to ensure their own continued electoral 
success.   While it is certainly true that legislators in all democracies often behave in 
myopic ways, even the most rational and future-oriented legislator might correctly decide 
that it is not in the interest of far-off generations to control ghg emissions today.  One 
reason that a rational legislator might behave in this way is because the future is far away, 
and economic growth will make it rational to invest today in growth and then use the 
proceeds later to reduce ghg emissions.
149 This is the usual economic justification for 
such long-term discounting, and it is by now quite well known.   
But there is another reason for rational failure to control ghg emissions today, one 
that is much less well known.  The argument is somewhat complex, and here I can only 
provide its outlines.  The basic idea is this: models of the impact of global warming are 
highly uncertain, new and therefore likely to contain many errors.  Over time, the models 
may improve, or they may fail to improve.
150  However, every year in which predictions 
of the models are failed to be validated represent a data point indicating that the models 
are lacking and in important ways incorrect.  Now suppose that a super-rational member 
of Congress believes model predictions of serious climate change in the far distant future, 
say 100 years.  At the same time, however, legislation requiring costly actions to reduce 
                                                 
149 This important justification for postponing investments in ghg emission reduction is a consequence of 
standard assumptions made in neoclassical growth models first applied to climate change by William 
Nordhaus.  For a clear recent summary, see William Nordhaus, Critical Assumptions in the Stern Review 
on Climate Change, 317 Science 201 (2007). 
150 The kind of learning that I implicity assume here may be much too optimistic. In a recent paper, Gerard 
H. Roe and Marcia B. Baker, Why is Climate Sensitivity So Unpredictable?, 318 Sci. 629, 631 (2007) have 
elegantly shown how asymmetric uncertainty – with a very long right tail in the distribution of predicted 
change in global average temperature ∆T from a doubling of tropospheric C02 relative to preindustrial 
levels – “is not an artifact of the analyses or choice of model parameters.  It is an inevitable consequence of 
a system in which the net feedbacks are substantially positive.”  In other words, if as climate models 
presume, positive feedbacks from C02 predominate (e.g., ice sheets melting, lowering albedo, leading to 
higher surface temperatures, more melting, and so on), then such models will always attach some positive 
probability to very high potential temperature increases.  Perhaps most importantly,  “foreseeable 
improvements in the understanding of physical processes, and in the estimation of their effects from 
observations, will not yield large reductions in the envelope of climate sensitivity.”  Id. at 631.  50 
ghg emissions cannot get majority support unless Congress is persuaded that some very 
severe harm from climate change will occur much sooner.  Such relatively imminent 
harms will then be the official justification for passing ghg reduction legislation.  But if 
legislation is passed with the express purpose of preventing imminent harm from global 
warming, and in fact temperatures increase not at all or only very slowly in the near 
future and the near-term harm that justified costly legislative ghg reduction requirements 
does not occur, there will be enormous pressure on Congress to amend the law to weaken 
its ghg reduction requirements. (A very similar story in fact took place with the CAA 
itself).  Once weakened by future amendment, it may be very difficult it not politically 
impossible to return to a statute that adequately protects against the predicted long-term 
consequences.  In short, by passing legislation based on predicted short-term 
consequences, Congress may drastically increase the stakes in the accuracy of short-term 
predictions from climate models.  But climate models cannot make accurate short term 
(five to ten year) predictions (among other reasons, because the cannot predict ENSO and 
NAO events that are the major determinants of major climate events on these timescales).  
Hence the justification for legislation imposing present day costs for the far-off future 
will likely fail, leading to legislative repeal and a worsened status quo then if ghg 
emission requirements were postponed. 
 
 
III. By Requiring that EPA Regulate GHG Emissions Under the CAA, the Supreme 
Court has Reduced the Likelihood that Congress will Pass Economically Sound and 
Environmentally Effective Global Warming Legislation 
 
As explained in the previous Part of this Article, what the Supreme Court did in 
Massachusetts v. EPA was to allow (some) states that perceive they will gain from 
federal climate change regulation to bring a lawsuit forcing a federal agency to regulate 
to protect their interests, at the possible expense of other states and regions.
151  In this 
                                                 
151 See Faulk and Gray, Stormy Weather Ahead?, supra note __ at 65-74; Adler, Massachusetts v. EPA 
Heats Up Climate Policy No Less than Administrative Law, supra note ___ at ___ (“….[o]nce the EPA 
makes the required finding under Section 202 [the automobile tailpipe provision], it will be child’s play to 
force greenhouse gas emission regulation under other Clean Air Act provisions.”)  For  the same 
conclusion, but from the perspective of the plaintiffs in Massachusetts v. EPA, see Lisa Heinzerling, 
Climate Change in the Supreme Court, 38 Envtl. L. 3, 5 (2008)(“…the legal reasoning behind EPA’s 
decision not to control greenhouse gas emissions in setting New Source Performance Standards for power 
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Part, I explain how by compelling the EPA to regulate, the Court has radically changed 
the stakes in Congressional bargaining over possible federal legislation and a 
consequence made socially desirable, efficient federal greenhouse gas legislation much 
less likely.  
 
A. Regional winners, regional losers and legislative bargaining versus regulatory 
litigation over climate change policy  
 
Twenty foot sea level increases in Massachusetts and the Atlantic coast; more 
severe drought in the Southwestern U.S. than at any time since the Medieval period.  
Facing such severe dire consequences, one might have expected that Congress would 
have long ago passed climate change legislation.  It has not.  A rationale for allowing 
Massachusetts to have standing to sue to force rulemaking under the CAA might be that 
it will force Congressional action.  However, Congressional bargaining in the shadow of 
rulemaking that has been forced upon the agency – the result in Massachusetts v. EPA – 
is likely to be far different than Congressional bargaining without such ongoing 
regulation.  By forcing EPA to regulate ghg emissions under a statute that is not designed 
to regulate emissions with the impact of ghg’s, the Court has made socially desirable 
federal climate change legislation less likely.   
The reason is this.  The states have quite divergent interests in greenhouse gas 
regulation.  This is a clear lesson of the discussion thus far and is further illustrated by 
Figure 1 above, which shows the radical differences in state per capita C02 emissions as 
of 2003. Were the matter left to Congress – the body that actually wrote the CAA – then 
presumably Congressional representatives from some states – such as Massachusetts -- 
would be lobbying the agency to regulate, while others – such as Texas -- would lobby 
the agency not to regulate ghg’s. The agency would face pressure from both ghg 
regulation winners and ghg regulation losers.  In this game, one would expect ghg 
regulatory losers to argue, inter alia, that even if ghg emissions should be regulated, the 
way to do so is not by imposing traditional automobile emission limits or other traditional 
command control requirements under the CAA, but through a cap and trade regime, or 
perhaps entirely differently, through a system of subsidies for the development of carbon 
sequestration technologies.   Whatever the EPA decided, it would have had an 52 
opportunity to hear from precisely those members of Congress who will be the ones to 
respond legislatively to whatever the agency decides.  Moreover, regulatory losers in 
Congress might be able to stop ghg’s from being regulated under the CAA simply by 
lobbying the agency, without having to actually introduce legislation. 
What the Court has done by allowing certain state attorney generals to bypass 
Congressional bargaining is to radically shift the legislative burden in a way that 
effectively forces legislative action.   After the decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, federal 
legislators who oppose ghg emission control under the current CAA cannot simply lobby 
the agency not to promulgate such regulations, for the agency is now under a court order 
requiring it to issue them.
152  Instead they must take the very costly step of actually 
introducing legislation to stop the agency’s court-ordered rulemaking.   
The Court has not only, however, increased the cost to federal legislators of 
influencing agency behavior.  More importantly, and non-intuitively, by unilaterally 
altering the status quo – by forcing what is likely to be clearly sup-optimal ghg emission 
control under the CAA – the Court has provided some benefits to jurisdictions that are 
net beneficiaries, while imposing costs on others.  This reduces the marginal gain from 
new legislation to beneficiary jurisdictions.  And while cost-bearing jurisdictions could 
lower their cost with a better choice of instruments, whether this is of much value to 
beneficiary jurisdictions depends upon the slope of the marginal benefit curve.   
Generally, with a flat marginal benefit curve, meaning relative constant marginal benefit, 
shifting down the marginal cost curve means a big potential increase in the optimal level 
of reduction and big potential increases in benefits.  With a very steep marginal benefit 
curve, meaning marginal benefits that fall quickly, as the level of ghg reduction increases, 
there will be relatively small net benefit from reducing marginal cost.  If what legislators 
really need to say is that some decrease in ghg’s has been achieved, so that the marginal 
benefit is quickly decreasing beyond some point, then we are in the latter case, and the 
“better” policy provides primarily lower costs, and legislators from beneficiary 
jurisdictions would not, absent side payments in legislative deals, have a big incentive to 
                                                 
152 It is not of course literally impossible to lobby an agency that is under a court order to issue regulations.  
My statement implicitly assumes that the cost to an agency from  failing to comply with the court order is 
sufficiently high that members of Congress cannot  offer a sufficiently high reward to induce the agency to 
violate the court order.  53 
legislate. Note that such a technology is precisely the sort that would generate market 
gains from trade.   
But the legislature is not a market, and just because an approach would improve 
upon the regulatory status quo does not mean it will be enacted.  The currency for 
legislative deals is generally the exchange of policies and programs, and whether or not 
such an exchange can be implemented is highly uncertain and dependent upon the overall 
legislative agenda at a particular point in time.  This is to make again the very important 
point that the Coase Theorem does not apply to legislative bargaining.
153  The reason is 
that efficient, Coasean bargaining requires that winners from ghg emission reductions be 
better off with an efficient reduction than with a bigger, but inefficient reduction, at least 
after side payments by the cost-bearing regions.  But within a legislature, such side 
payments are unlikely.  Suppose, for example, EPA proposes automobile ghg emission 
regulation that would cost ghg control losers $100 and yield ghg control winner states a 
$40 political benefit.  If for $70 the cost-bearing states could generate a $35 benefit, then 
both sides would be better off if the cost-bearers adopted the cheaper approach and then 
paid the beneficiaries any amount above $5.  But such side payments, feasible among 
private plaintiffs, are generally not possible to make within the federal legislature.  They 
would require interstate transfers that are generally possible only in the form of in-kind 
deals struck in the centralized legislature.   Without such transfers, the state plaintiffs 
have every incentive to stick with the regulation – the inefficient $100 fix. 
Even more seriously, even assuming that state Attorney Generals have the same 
incentives as do Congressional representatives, the Court’s decision allows them in effect 
to get greenhouse gas emission control for free, whereas in the federal legislative arena, 
representatives from states that are net beneficiaries from ghg emission controls would 
have to bargain with representatives from states that are net losers from such controls. 
What one sees in the Massachusetts v. EPA suit is a set of plaintiff states with relatively 
little to lose, and hence much to gain, from ghg emission controls on automobiles.  On 
the other side of that litigation, one saw states whose representatives perceive that such 
controls will generate net costs, rather than benefits, for them.  Unlike Congress, the 
                                                 
153See Daron Acemoglu, Why Not A Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment, And 
Politics, 14 Journal of Comparative Economics 620 (2003).  But see also Donald Wittman (book arguing 
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defendant states in the litigation, regardless of their numbers, could not vote to stop 
regulation.  Only the Justices have a vote.  Even if EPA were to get it right, and find ghg 
emission controls whose aggregate benefits exceed their aggregate costs, it is still 
possible that the majority of states would be net losers from such controls and that their 
federal legislative representatives would have successfully opposed legislation 
implementing such controls.   
A final and very significant problem with the Court’s expansive reading of the 
CAA to include C02 emissions is that not only does the decision change the status quo, 
but it also changes legislative expectations about how the Court would likely interpret 
global warming legislation. After Massachusetts v. EPA, legislators should rationally 
expect very broad, expansive interpretation of such legislation.  Especially for legislators 
who are moderate on global warming – representing constituencies that perceive both 
benefits and costs from legislation curbing ghg emissions – the expectation of such 
expansive judicial interpretation threatens to increase the costs of ghg curbs much above 
what such legislators would actually support.  As shown recently by Rodriguez and 
Weingast,
154 is such legislators (often moderates from the minority party) perceive that 
“the deals they negotiate in order to support cloture will be undone through expansionary 
readings by the courts, then they are not likely to bother negotiating these deals in the 
first place.”  Were a moderate legislator to support, for example, “economically 
justifiable” caps on ghg emissions, then she would need to worry that the Court would 
broadly interpret “economically justifiable” to authorize extremely onerous ghg caps.   
The prediction that the Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA has if anything 
lessened incentives for innovative new federal climate change legislation seems to be 
borne out by federal legislative developments thus far.   In the Energy Independence and 
Security Act of 2007,
155 Congress: 1) set a new target for automobile and light truck fuel 
economy of 35 miles per gallon, to be achieved by 2020; 2) mandated a large increase in 
the minimum annual level of renewable fuel in U.S. transportation fuel, rising from 9 
billion gallons in 2009 to 36 billion gallons by 2022; and, 3) set new efficiency standards 
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for light bulbs and several other consumer household appliances.
156  None of these 
policies are new,
157 and none are focused specifically on reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions.  Although they may have that effect, such an impact is hardly guaranteed. 
Meeting the new auto fuel efficiency standards by shifting fleets to diesel could, for 
example, actually increase C02 emissions even while reducing oil consumption.   Even 
more seriously, although the Energy Independence and Security Act does require that by 
2016, all increases in renewable fuels must be met with biofuels derived from sources 
other than corn,
158 very recent work has shown that regardless of the source, increasing 
production of ethanol fuel is likely to massively increase C02 emissions.  One study, for 
instance, shows that when account is taken of the carbon sequestration lost when forest 
and grasslands are converted to biofuel cropland, even biofuel production from 
switchgrass increases carbon dioxide emissions by at least 50%.
159  And this is the best 
case for ethanol.  Another recent study estimates that when forests, peatlands, savannahs 
and grasslands are lost in order to produce other biofuel crops such as corn and 
sugarcane, such conversion releases between 17 and 420 times more C02 than the annual 
ghg reduction provided by burning the biofuels instead of gasoline.
160
It would thus be fanciful to argue that what Congress has done in the Energy 
Independence and Security Act of 2007 is to take dramatic and effective action on the 
problem of ghg emissions and climate change.  Instead, Congress has if anything simply 
used the general panic over climate change as an excuse for passing legislation that 
benefits certain special interest groups while quite possibly increasing ghg emissions.  As 
for legislation actually focused on the climate change problem it is true that over the past 
                                                 
156 For a summary of these provisions, see Fred Sissine et. al., Energy Independence and Security Act of 
2007: A Summary of Major Provisions (CRS Report RL34294, December 21, 2007).  
157 As pointed out earlier, supra note __, in the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Public Law 109-58, 119 Stat. 
609 (August 8, 2005), Congress tripled the ethanol requirement in automobile fuel.  The Energy 
Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492 (December 19, 2007), further 
increases this ethanol requirement and requires that ethanol come from sources other than corn by 2016.  
This latter aspect of the bill is, of course, completely incredible: after having subsidized corn-based ethanol 
production for by-then almost 20 years, it is hard to believe that the 2016 Congress would really stick to its 
earlier commitment to pull subsidies for corn-based ethanol.  
158 See Sissine et. al., Energy Independence and Security Act, supra note __ at CRS-5. 
159 Timothy Searchinger et. al., Use of U.S. Croplands for Biofuels Increases Greenhouse Gases Through 
Emissions from Land Use Change, Science Express, Feb. 7, 2008, 10.1126/science.1151861. 
160 Joseph Fargione et. al., Land Clearing and the Biofuel Carbon Debt, Science Express, Feb. 7, 2008, 
10.1126 Science.1152747. 56 
several years, there have been a number of bills introduced in Congress that would set up 
comprehensive climate change regulatory regimes.
161 Virtually all of these are what 
economists would call market-based, in that they would create ghg cap and trade regimes 
(the vast majority) or a carbon tax.
162  As I discuss below in the concluding section of this 
article, the widespread preference for cap and trade global warming regulatory regimes is 
in my view based on an overly facile belief that a policy instrument that has seemed to 
work relatively well for some air pollutants (in the U.S., sulfur dioxide and nitrous 
oxides) will also be appropriate for a radically different set of air emissions whose 
reduction involves virtually very sector of the U.S. economy.   However, even were one 
to assume that a cap and trade scheme is in fact a socially desirable way to reduce ghg 
emissions, Congress has not yet enacted such a regime: my prediction remains that EPA’s 
promulgation of ghg emission regulations under the CAA
163 will make such legislative 
action less likely.  
 
IV. The International Nature of the Global Warming Problem not Only Justifies 
EPA in Not Regulating GHG’S Under the CAA but Means that Conventional 
Regulatory Instruments Will not be Effective in Addressing Global Warming  
 
  According to the majority, under the statutory command that EPA must determine 
whether an air pollutant “cause[s] or contribute[s] to, air pollution which may reasonably 
be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare,”
164 the EPA can “avoid taking further 
action only if it determines that greenhouse gases do not contribute to climate change or 
if it provides some reasonable explanation as to why it cannot or will not exercise its 
discretion to determine whether they do.”
165 According to the majority, EPA’s reasons for 
not regulating greenhouse gases – the existence of executive branch voluntary 
greenhouse gas reduction programs, the impact of domestic regulation on the President’s 
ability to negotiate to reduce developing nation ghg emissions, that curtailing motor-
                                                 
161 For a concise summary, see Victor Flatt, Taking the Legislative Temperature: Which Federal Climate 
Change Legislative Proposal is “Best”? 102 N.W.U. L. Rev. 123 (2007). 
162 See Flatt, Taking the Legislative Temperature, supra note __ at 134-136. 
163 EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson has in fact very recently stated that the passage of the Energy 
Independence and Security Act “does not relieve the agency of its responsibility” to promulgate ghg 
emission regulations under the CAA.  See 19 Clean Air Report ___ (available online on Feb. 7, 2008). 
164 42 U.S.C. §7521(a)(1). 
165 Slip opinion at 31. 57 
vehicle ghg emissions alone would be an inefficient, “piecemeal” approach to regulation 
– “have nothing to do with whether greenhouse gases contribute to climate change.”
166 
And again: “Nor can EPA avoid its statutory obligation by noting the uncertainty 
surrounding various features of climate change…If the scientific uncertainty is so 
profound that it precludes EPA from making a reasoned judgment as to whether 
greenhouse gases contribute to global warming, EPA must say so.” 
Now the narrow legal answer to this question involves a determination of whether 
an agency can ever refuse to refuse to inquire into whether an air emission reasonably 
endangers public health or welfare on the ground that there is simply too much 
uncertainty over the effects of the emission to make such a finding.  Had Congress 
specifically and explicitly told EPA to regulate ghg emissions, then the agency would 
obviously have lacked authority to defer regulation on the ground that the effects of ghg’s 
are too uncertain.
167 But there is no such command to the agency to regulate ghg’s 
anywhere in the CAA, and the legal question under the Chevron test is then whether the 
agency’s decision to defer its consideration of ghg emission regulation could be 
understood as a reasonable exercise of its statutory discretion.  
For Justice Scalia writing in dissent, the reasons given by EPA for its deferral – its 
desire to avoid a fractured, piecemeal approach to ghg emission regulation, and to avoid 
interfering with Executive branch climate change programs and international negotiations 
– were imminently reasonable, precisely the kinds of “considerations executive agencies 
regularly take into account (and ought to take into account) when deciding whether to 
enter a new field.”
168 Moreover, as Justice Scalia noted, EPA did explain the basis for its 
view that there was too much uncertainty to justify ghg emission regulation at the current 
time: the 2001 National Research Council Report.
169
In rejecting as lawful the EPA’s deferral of ghg emission regulation under the 
CAA, the Supreme Court majority repeatedly conflates uncertainty regarding “various 
features of climate change” with uncertainty over whether “greenhouse gases contribute 
to climate change.”  However, as the majority notes, the statutory question is precisely 
                                                 
166 Slip opinion at 31. 
167 Under the doctrine of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) 
168 Slip opinion at 5. 
169 NRC, National Research Council, Climate Change Science: An Analysis of Some Key Questions 
(2001), quoted by Justice Scalia at length at pp. 6-8 of his slip opinion. 58 
whether ghg’s cause a form of “air pollution which may reasonably be expected to 
endanger public health or welfare.” That is, under the language of the statute, the precise 
legal question is not whether there is too much uncertainty over the role of ghg’s in 
causing climate change for the agency to regulate; it is instead whether there is so much 
uncertainty over whether ghg’s may “reasonably be expected to endanger public health or 
welfare” that the agency does not need to engage in rulemaking.  
Here, as in the earlier sections of this article, I want to look at the issue of 
uncertainty and regulatory delay raised in Massachusetts v. EPA from the point of view 
of pragmatic statutory interpretation, inquiring into whether the purposes, interests and 
policies that supported the CAA would also reject the EPA’s reasons for failing to 
regulate ghg’s under that statute.  On this approach, one evaluates the reasonableness of 
EPA’s decision to defer regulating ghg emissions under the CAA by asking: What kind 
of uncertainty do we have with respect to the actual harm from climate change and how 
does it compare with the harms that the CAA was drafted to ameliorate?    
A complete answer to this question requires a sustained analysis of the causes and 
treatment of uncertainty in predicting the human consequences of climate change.  I give 
that complete answer elsewhere, and incorporate here only the most pertinent points. 
The air pollutants that are regulated under the CAA were all perceived by 
Congress to be presently causing harm to human health or public welfare.  Congress 
delegated to the EPA the job of ensuring that similar pollutants were controlled and 
reduced to appropriately “safe” levels, with due account for changes in scientific 
knowledge regarding the impacts of pollutants at various levels of ambient concentration.  
To be sure, there is plenty of scientific uncertainty in the regulation of statutory air 
pollutants under the CAA: uncertainty in particular over whether how various human 
health harms are statistically related to the ambient concentration level of various 
regulated pollutants.  But with virtually every pollutant that is regulated under the CAA, 
it is undisputed that at sufficiently high ambient concentrations, that pollutant will cause 
some statistically significant harm to the human health of members of the present 
generation of Americans who are exposed to the pollutant.   59 
Things are quite different with ghg emissions.  Even were one to view the recent 
IPCC Report on the impacts of global warming
170 with an attitude of complete credulity 
and blind faith, the most that one can say is that that report recounts various changes that 
have occurred due to global warming – as for example with the breeding seasons and 
ranges of various species – but few if any significant harms to the health or welfare of 
Americans.  The Report is concerned primarily with projecting future harms that its 
authors believe will occur sometime late in the present century under various future 
climate scenarios, such as the potentially catastrophic flooding along the American 
Atlantic and Gulf coasts and severe drought in the southwest discussed earlier.    
Now as with any regulatory decision, if EPA decides to regulate ghg’s because of 
these projected harms, two types of error are possible.  A Type I error occurs when the 
regulator incorrectly takes action: the regulation was either not needed or is ineffective.  
In the case of global warming, a Type I error means that ghg emissions are reduced and 
the harms do not occur – for example the American climate becomes warmer and 
everywhere wetter, and there is adaptation to sea level rise, with people on balance being 
better off as they migrate to the upper Midwest -- and the agency has inflicted a gigantic 
loss across the economy, which would not be approved of by Congress at the time.   
Crucially, for federal regulation of ghg emissions, there is another potential source of 
Type I error:  EPA could regulate U.S. ghg emissions but China and India and other 
developing countries fail to control ghg’s, in which case the harm from global warming 
occurs despite U.S. costs to cut ghg emissions, so that regulation has generated costs but 
no benefits.  With global warming there are two types of type I error: regulating when 
global warming in fact generates little harm to the U.S., and regulating when global 
warming is indeed harmful to the U.S. but occurs despite U.S. ghg emission reductions. 
Type II error arises when the agency fails to regulate ghg emissions and harm 
occurs.   Such an error would arise when global warming is harmful, and when other 
nations or sub national governments fail to implement regulations that are sufficient to 
offset the American failure to regulate.   
Now consider the regulation of traditional air pollutants.  Type I errors for 
traditional air pollution regulation arise when the EPA regulates – meaning levels of air 
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pollution are reduced by some amount – but the existing levels were not actually harmful.  
In this case, there is an economy-wide wasted cost of pollution reduction.   In the case of 
traditional air pollutants, Type II errors arise when the agency fails to regulate, but the 
status quo pollution level is indeed harmful, and states and local governments do not take 
adequate steps to reduce it.   
  Comparing the regulation of ghg’s with the regulation of traditional air pollutants, 
we can see the enormous significance to rational regulatory deliberation of the fact that 
unlike the primary focus of the CAA – the local impacts of primarily localized air 
pollution – global warming is all about the local effects of global atmospheric change.  
The difference comes not in the Type II errors: both with traditional air pollution and 
ghg’s, Type II errors arise when global warming generates harm to the U.S. but other 
governmental actors – states and localities in the case of traditional pollutants, other 
nation states plus sub national governmental units in the case of ghg’s – fail to take 
sufficient action to offset EPA’s failure to act.  The difference comes instead in the nature 
of Type I errors.    
In general, a type I error occurs when the costs of regulation are incurred but with 
no benefit.  With traditional domestic air pollution, a Type I error occurs only if there is 
indeed no harm at the status quo levels of pollution (so regulatory reduction was an 
error).
171  With global warming and ghg gases, however, a Type I error can arise both 
when global warming does not generate net harm to the U.S. and when other nations fail 
to regulate and continue to increase their own ghg emissions, so that U.S. ghg regulation 
generated no decrease in harm.   With traditional air pollutants, a sufficiently large 
reduction in domestic emissions necessarily reduces harm if indeed the existing status 
quo level of pollution was harmful.  With ghg emissions, even if ghg-induced global 
warming is harmful, it is possible that even the complete elimination of U.S. ghg 
emissions will not reduce such harm, because increasing emissions from other nations 
more than offset the U.S. reduction.  
                                                 
171 Somewhat more concretely, Congress was concerned in the Clean Air Act with local or regional air 
pollution problems that could actually be solved through State Implementation Plans.  But even if every 
state were to take aggressive action to reduce ghg emissions, it could have no impact at all on global 
warming.  See Faulk and Gray, Stormy Weather Ahead?,  supra note __ at 66. 61 
All of this is to say that at the best, the power of the EPA is extremely limited in 
the case of taking effective action to reduce the harm from global warming relative to its 
power to reduce the harm from traditional pollution.  But matters may in fact be worse 
than this.  It may be that the more effective is the U.S. EPA in reducing ghg emissions, 
the weaker is the incentive for other countries to do the same. Such scenarios are in fact 
very easy to imagine.  
Most simply, suppose that the U.S. reduces its ghg emissions but global warming 
seems not to be accelerating as predicted.  Under such circumstances, there will be less 
pressure on late movers to act.  Suppose somewhat differently that the U.S. reduces its 
ghg emissions and the atmospheric stock level of C02 begins – for whatever reason -- to 
stabilize or even decline. On this scenario, there is once again less pressure on other 
countries to act.
172  Suppose finally that the U.S. reduces ghg emissions but there is no 
new apparent harm from global warming.  Once again, there will be less pressure on late 
movers to act.   
There are, on the other hand, scenarios under which unilateral action by the U.S. 
could increase the incentives for other nations to act to reduce ghg emissions.  If the 
atmospheric stock of C02 continues to increase despite U.S. ghg reductions, and global 
average temperature and harms from such temperature changes also continue to increase, 
then unilateral U.S. action could increase the incentive of late moving countries to act by 
revealing that the cost of action is lower than expected.  In other words, were U.S. action 
to generate effective and unexpectedly cheap technologies for ghg reduction, and were 
late moving countries such as China to perceive that they had become pivotal – in the 
sense that by reducing their emissions, they could in fact reduce harms suffered by their 
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Environmental Problems: The Effects of Unilateral Actions Taken by One Country, 20 J. Envl. Econ. & 
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average, 13% less
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 as opposed to a 
situation with no leader. This produces benefits
 also to the leaders but not enough to recover all the costs
 of 
taking a leading position.)   62 
own populations
173 – then early U.S. action could sufficiently lower the cost of emission 
control that it would spur action by late movers.
174 Still, even if unilateral U.S. action 
revealed unexpectedly cheap and effective technologies for reducing ghg emissions 
technologies, and late moving countries would realize a self-interested benefit from 
reducing their own ghg emissions, whether such late movers would take still costly action 
to reduce ghg emissions would depend upon how quickly they are growing, how high 
their per capita income has grown, and in general on the whole set of factors determining 
the domestic demand for and supply of pollution reduction efforts.  For pollutants such as 
sulfur dioxide, there is evidence of an environmental “Kuznets Curve,” whereby 
emissions at first increase with industrialization and national per capita income but then 
eventually fall for sufficiently high levels of wealth.
175 There is no evidence of a 
consistent relationship of this sort between national income and C02; instead, C02 
emissions monotonically increase with national income for some countries but exhibit an 
inverted U-shaped relationship for others.
176 To assume that in the case of, for example, 
China, there will someday suddenly appear a new demand for ghg reduction merely 
because other nations have previously discovered relatively cheap and effective ways to 
reduce their own ghg emissions would be to ignore the striking lesson of the present day, 
when Chinese conventional pollution has soared with its industrialization. Since China 
has largely eschewed the emission reduction technologies for conventional pollutants 
made available by pollution control efforts in already-industrialized countries, why would 
                                                 
173 Note that the existence of a treaty could significantly enhance the positive impact of early-moving 
behavior by essentially reducing the potential harm from treaty defection to treaty adherents.  See Jean-
Christoph Pereau and Tarik Tazdait, Cooperation and Unilateral Commitment in the Presence of Global 
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176 See the evidence presented in Elbert Dijkgraaf and Herman R.J. Vollebergh, A Note on Testing for 
Environmental Kuznets Curve, OCFEB Research Memorandum 0103, May, 2001, available at 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=703970.  The inconsistent relationship for C02 is perhaps 
predictable, given the more general finding in the Environmental Kuznets Curve literature that the more 
dispersed is the externality from a particular pollutant, the higher the turning point in national income at 
which levels of the pollutant begin to decline; for pollutants with the most dispersed negative impacts, there 
often is no turning point.  See Levinson, Environmental Kuznets Curve, supra note __ at 1. 63 
one expect China to adopt at some future point the ghg reduction technologies made 
available by present-day ghg emission reduction requirements in such countries?  
  This may be overly pessimistic.
177  China, India, Brazil and other rapidly 
industrializing countries may indeed someday provide a lucrative market for ghg 
reduction technologies – most especially carbon capture and storage -- developed by 
virtue of unilateral U.S. ghg emission reduction requirements.
178  And there are other 
potential justifications for unilateral action that have not been formally modeled by 
economists.  For example, by acting unilaterally, the U.S. could at the very least alter 
somewhat the rate of change in global C02 emissions, and such a change in the global 
rate of change in C02 could provide more information on the actual impact of changing 
C02 stocks on the crucial regional impacts of increasing global average temperature.   
Further exploration of these and other possible justifications for the U.S. to take costly 
actions now to reduce ghg emissions is beyond the scope of the present paper.  The 
important and concluding point for present purposes is that none of these very complex 
and indirect benefits from present day ghg reduction make ghg reduction even remotely 
similar in its anticipated impact to the kind of pollution reduction that Congress intended 
to cover under the CAA.  That statute mandated federal, state and local regulations that if 
effectively enforced, would be successful in reducing conventional pollutants, and 
improving ambient air quality, regardless  of the present or future actions of other 
countries.  Such effective unilateral action is at the best extremely unlikely in the case of 
climate change. 
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reduction the developing countries by enough to offset both the shift of dirty good production to such 
countries (so-called leakage) and also free-riding by such countries.  64 
 
V. Conclusion: the CAA does not cover GHG Emissions, but this Does not Mean 
that Climate Change is Not a Problem Requiring a Policy Response
  
  It is important to understand the limits to the scope of the argument that I have 
made in this Article.   My argument is that the distribution of short to medium term costs 
and benefits to the United States from taking costly action to reduce ghg emissions is so 
very different than the distribution of costs and benefits from regulating air pollutants 
under the CAA that it is completely unreasonable to interpret the CAA as covering ghg 
emissions.   This argument does not imply that climate change is not a problem for the 
U.S., nor does it imply that the U.S. should do nothing to reduce its ghg emissions.  There 
is credible scientific evidence that were ghg emissions to continue to increase, then in the 
very long run – beyond 2100 – there are a variety of severe harms that might befall 
people in the United States.
179  There is also credible scientific evidence that even in the 
short to medium term – up to 2100 – many developing countries are likely to suffer harm 
as a result even of moderate changes in climate.
180   Hence as a matter purely of national 
self-interest, the U.S. has an interest in adopting policies designed to lessen the likelihood 
of harmful far-distant climate change.   And for a variety of foreign policy reasons – 
ranging from a concern with international equity to a concern with the possible impact of 
climate change in developing countries in prompting mass immigration and exacerbating 
the international terrorist threat – the U.S. has an interest in taking costly action to lessen 
harmful near to medium term climate change impacts in developing countries.  
                                                 
179 The economic studies of the impact of climate change cited supra note __, for example, clearly show 
that for temperature increases above 7 degrees centigrade inflict large net losses on American agriculture. 
180 Consider, for example, Africa.  As the IPCC notes, climate is a “significant control on day-to-day 
economic development of Africa,” with agriculture and water-resource sectors especially vulnerable to 
climate fluctuations.  See M.I. Boko et. al., Africa, in Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and 
Vulnerability.  Contribution of Working Group II to the 4
th Assessment of the IPCC 433, 436 (M.L. Parry, 
et. al., eds. 2007).  Under a variety of future climate scenarios, the IPCC predicts that there will be by the 
2080’s a “significant decrease in suitable rain-fed land extent and production suitable  for cereals,” with an 
increase in arid (desert) and semi-arid land in Africa of 5-8% and the likely disappearance of what 
production from Africa.  Id. at 448.  For an Asian example, see Jonathan T. Overpeck and Julia E. Cole, 
Lessons from a Distant Monsoon, 445 Nature 270 (2007)(opining that if the Indian monsoon intensifies, as 
some climate models predict, then Indonesia in particular will have more severe and longer droughts, 
imperiling rural livelihoods and natural resources there.)  Not only is  developing world agriculture more 
susceptible to drought: increases in sea level that cause a loss of coastal agricultural land are much more 
damaging in poor countries that cannot as easily substitute for land loss by increasing fertilizer use and in 
which agriculture is a much larger share of the national economy.  See Francesco Bosello et. al., Economy-
Wide Estimates of the Implications of Climate Change: Sea Level Rise, 37 Envl. & Res. Econ. 549, 557 
(2006).   65 
  The optimal U.S. response to climate change depends upon why the U.S. is 
acting: to attempt to avert short to medium term harm to developing countries, or instead 
to prevent very distant and uncertain and yet also potentially very costly harm to the U.S.  
From the long term point of view, clearly a program of significant government subsidies 
for research and development into clean coal (carbon sequestration) as well as non-
carbon-based energy sources makes sense.   If and when such technologies are 
developed, their adoption can also be subsidized.  Such a pattern of expenditure would 
acknowledge an obligation of the present generation to do something now – the U.S. 
government of today should spend far, far more than it has thus far in directly funding an 
indirectly rewarding research and development into technologies that generate no or low 
C02 emissions – while also shifting to future generations a good share of the cost of 
widespread adoption of whatever technologies are developed.    
There is no guarantee that such technologies will come on line quickly enough, 
however, to help developing countries deal with adverse short to medium term 
consequences of a warming climate.  But given the very long half-life of atmospheric 
carbon dioxide,
181 it is far from clear that anything but an immediate and drastic de-
carbonization of the economy of the U.S. and other large C02 emitting countries will do 
anything to slow or reverse global warming in time to prevent harmful impacts on 
developing countries; even with drastic de-carbonization, such countries may well suffer 
harm from a warming climate.   That is, the short to medium term harm from climate 
change is due not to current emissions, but primarily to atmospheric C02 that was emitted 
over the last thirty-five or so years, most of which will remain in the atmosphere for 
decades to come.  Radical de-carbonization – such as a wholesale conversion to nuclear 
power – might well drastically cut current C02 emissions,
182 but it will not prevent short 
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to medium term harm to developing countries.  Such harm can be averted only by either 
large scale adaptation in such countries, or by moving people out of harm’s way: that is, 
by large scale immigration from hazardous developing countries to safer developed 
countries.  The choice among these and other alternatives, and in particular the question 
of how much developed countries should pay to help developing countries cope with 
climate change, involves questions of relative efficacy, efficiency and fairness.  These 
issues are important, but their consideration is beyond the scope of the present article and 
best left to future work.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
than solving the problems of burning coal safely – especially the highly mobile carbon dioxide that is the 
inevitable consequence of coal burning.”)  67 
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